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Utilizing the stochastic frontier approach, this study conducts a comparative analysis of 
profit efficiency and cost inefficiency of commercial banks operating in 29 sub-Saharan 
African (SSA) countries by bank ownership (domestic bank, SSA foreign bank or non-
SSA foreign bank), as well as by the bank size during 2000-07. Tobit regressions are 
employed to assess the impact of environmental factors on the efficiency of commercial 
banks. The key findings of this empirical analysis suggest that foreign banks tend to 
outperform domestic banks in terms of profit efficiency. In terms of efficiency by bank 
size, the smaller the bank, the more profit efficient the bank will be; medium or 
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For the latest decade, foreign bank participation has increased tremendously in developing 
countries, although the pattern of entry has varied. For example, over fifty per cent of 
banking assets are now in foreign-controlled banks in several countries in Latin America and 
Eastern Europe. In other regions including Africa, progress has been slower, but the trend is 
the same. As Eichengreen and Mussa (1998) discuss, allowing entry of foreign financial 
institutions has been one facet of a general trend towards reduced barriers to trade in financial 
services. While foreign bank entry is being embraced in many developing countries, the 
causes and effects of foreign entry are still being debated. It is also crucial to conduct 
research on bank efficiency and foreign entrants in other developing countries as well as 
Africa. Particularly, bank efficiency studies in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are relatively few, 
given the reasons such that the low level of financial development, small number of banks, 
limited market activities and lack of quality data.  
 
The recent empirical findings by Chen (2009), dealing with the efficiency of banks in ten 
SSA middle-income countries show that banks, on average, could save 20-30 per cent of their 
total costs if they were operating efficiently, and that foreign banks are more efficient than 
public banks and domestic private banks. It also mentions that factors affecting the efficiency 
levels are macroeconomic stability, depth of financial development, the degree of market 
competition, strong legal rights and contract laws, and better governance, including political 
stability and government effectiveness. 
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number of African countries began to restructure their 
financial sectors in order to boost banking efficiency (Brownbridge and Harvey 1998). 
Ngalande (2003) argues that efficiency in the banking sector is regarded as a key contributor 
to macroeconomic stability among central bankers in the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). Banking efficiency is also a precondition for economic growth and 
important for the effectiveness of monetary policy (Hartmann 2004).  
 
To the best of my knowledge, prior studies have not reported on efficiency analysis of 
commercial banks of cross-country panel datasets covering 29 SSA countries during 2000-07. 
A subject of bank efficiency study is, therefore, of interest to policy makers and bank 
regulators in Africa, as well as academics studying trends in bank performance in SSA 
countries. This study in particular attempts to address the following questions:  
 
a)  Are foreign banks more efficient than domestic banks? 
c)  What is the impact of foreign bank entry on the performance of domestic banks? 
c)  How is the banking efficiency of domestic and foreign banks associated with the 
financial development—accounting ratios as well as economic conditions? 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous literature 
on studies of bank performance and efficiency, as well as foreign bank entry, while briefly 
describing parametric and non-parametric approaches and concept of profit efficiency and 
cost inefficiency. This is followed by a description of methodology and data used in the 
study. The cost and alternative profit functions are used to estimate domestic and foreign 
banks’ cost inefficiency and profit efficiency by using a stochastic frontier approach. The 
estimated results of bank efficiency of domestic and foreign banks are compared to assess 2 
whether foreign banks are more profit or cost efficient than domestic ones. The paper 
concludes by summarizing the main findings and provides some suggestions for policy 
implications and future research.  
2 Literature  review   
Banking efficiency is a subject that has attracted increasing attention in recent years. Above 
all, there are two types of evidence on efficiency, one comparing the efficiency of foreign 
entrants with domestic competitors, the other showing that, within the subset of banks that 
expand abroad, banks that are more internationalized are also more efficient. Several studies 
of developed countries have found that foreign-owned banks are less efficient than domestic 
banks. 
  
Efficiency comparisons between foreign and domestic banks in developing countries yield 
very different results. Claessens et al. (2001) find that foreign banks have lower interest 
margins, overhead expenses and profitability than domestic banks in developed countries, 
while the opposite is true in developing countries. They interpret their results to imply that 
the reasons for foreign entry, as well as the competitive and regulatory conditions found 
abroad, differ significantly between developed and developing countries. Claessens and Lee 
(2002) discuss that foreign banks have also introduced improved risk management practices 
and imported supervision from parent country regulators, thereby helping strengthen banking 
systems. In contrast, increased competition may lower the franchise value of incumbent 
banks and can lead to financial instability. 
 
The evidence, which models foreign entry as a function of efficiency (and other factors), 
comes from Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000). They find that a bank’s return on assets is 
positively correlated with the degree to which it expands abroad. They also find that banks 
with a higher share of non-interest income are more likely to have a foreign presence. Their 
interpretation is that more innovative banks look for new profit opportunities and, therefore, 
have both a larger share of revenues from non-traditional activities and a greater propensity to 
expand abroad. For developing countries, such entrants would appear to bring many benefits, 
depending on the services they choose to provide.  
 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (1998) find that foreign bank entry tends to spur competition and make 
national banking markets more efficient. Increased foreign entry forces domestic banks to 
eliminate excess overhead and accept low profits. The major link between efficiency and 
foreign banks is associated with the number of foreign entrants, not with market share. This 
suggests that foreign entry increases competition and efficiency. However, this is the case of 
Korea which might not be fully applied to the African banking system. Using a panel of 89 
commercial banks drawn from nine SSA countries covering the period 1992-99, the empirical 
finding of Kirkpatrick et al. (2007) suggests that banks are on average 67 per cent profit 
efficient and that on average banks are 80 per cent cost efficient, in terms of both DFA and 
SFA metrics. Kirkpatrick et al. (2007) also find that an increase in the degree of foreign bank 
penetration, representing an increase in foreign bank ownership, is associated with a 
reduction in profit and cost x-inefficiency.  
 
Some previous empirical literature of bank efficiency finds that there exists an inverse 
relationship between the size of bank and profitability (e.g. Boyd and Runkle 1993; Miller 
and Noulas 1997, in the USA; Naceur 2003 in Tunisia; and Jiang et al. 2003 in Hong Kong). 3 
That is, the smaller the bank, the more profit efficient the bank will be. With regard to the 
study of the efficiencies of banks in Ghana, Akoena et al. (2009) suggest that small banks 
have larger scale efficiencies than the big banks, implying that (on average, at least) the large 
banks in Ghana are more removed from the point of their lowest average costs than the small 
banks and that the Bank of Ghana should be careful about encouraging bank mergers with the 
objective of improving bank efficiency. 
 
Claessens and Van Horen (2009) find that after controlling for the level of income of the 
home country of the foreign bank, geographical and cultural (language) distance does matter 
for the performance of the foreign bank, meaning that banks that are geographical and 
culturally close, have on average a higher profitability than foreign banks that are 
geographically and culturally distant. In the case of Pakistan, Mian (2006) finds that 
geographical or cultural distance is an important attribute in explaining the lending, recovery 
and renegotiation differences between domestic and foreign banks. In particular, the stronger 
these distance constraints are, the more geographically or culturally distant a foreign bank is. 
 
Furthermore, a theoretical model by Detragiache et al. (2006) shows that when domestic 
banks are better than foreign banks at monitoring soft information customers, foreign bank 
entry may hurt these customers and worsen welfare. The model also predicts that credit to the 
private sector should be lower in countries with more foreign bank penetration and that 
foreign banks should have a less risky loan portfolio. 
2.1  Parametric versus non-parametric 
In the literature dealing with the efficiency study, two major concepts are frequently used for 
measuring this frontier function: non-parametric and parametric approaches. The non 
parametric approach known under the name of DEA method (Data Envelopment Analysis)
1 
consists in estimating the frontier by using non-parametric mathematical linear programming. 
The method offers the advantage of simple application and restrictive assumptions are not 
required in advance with regard to the functional form. Its main disadvantage lies in the fact 
that this technique is unable to decompose the deviations of certain banks from the efficient 
production frontier into components: inefficiency and random error parts. The deviation as a 
whole is considered as inefficiency, irrespective of whether it derives from inefficient 
operation or exogenous effects independent of management. An additional problem is that the 
method disregards prices. The procedure focuses rather on measuring technological 
efficiency, based on technological and not economic optimization. 
 
The parametric methods are considered to be more sophisticated compared to non-parametric 
techniques, whereby the estimation of efficiency is based on economic optimization, given 
the underlying assumption of a stochastic optimal frontier. The parametric techniques most 
frequently used include the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA)
2 and the Distribution Free 
                                                 
1
 DEA is a non-parametric method for calculating relative efficiency scores in a multi- input-output production 
environment. It measures the performance of all decision-making units compared to the generated efficient 
frontier. Best-practice banks, which constructs the DEA frontier, produce given output combinations with the 
lowest level of inputs or achieve the highest level of output with a given level of inputs, i.e. operates with an 
optimal input-output combination. Firms, which do not operate on the optimal frontier, suffer a certain level of 
efficiency loss. 
2
 The SFA was independently developed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). 4 
Approach (DFA).
3 Parametric methods allow for incorporating both input allocative and 
technical efficiencies. The SFA decomposes random error terms and the production unit 
inefficiency and takes into account the existence of exogenous shocks.  
 
Given that in transition economies the quality of banking data is not perfect and measurement 
errors are quite widespread, Fries and Taci (2005) argue that parametric methods, which are 
more robust to data problems, would constitute more suitable empirical tools for analysing 
banking efficiency.
4 This study employs the stochastic frontiers based on a composed error 
model, which are considered superior to non-parametric frontiers in measuring efficiency and 
that enable us to distinguish between inefficiency and other exogenous shocks. 
2.2  Concept of profit efficiency and cost inefficiency 
Profit efficiency is the ratio of predicted actual profit to the predicted maximum profit which 
could be earned if a bank was as efficient as the best practice bank after adjusting for random 
error. Profit efficiency the is ability to achieve maximum profits for a given set of outputs, 
and the estimated values in the logarithm are bounded between zero and one. The higher the 
profit efficiency score is, the more profit efficient the bank will be. If the score is one, it 
means the most profit efficient bank. 
 
Cost inefficiency measures the change in a bank’s variable cost adjusted for random error, 
relative to the estimated cost needed to produce an output bundle as efficiently as the best-
practice bank in a sample facing the same exogenous variables. These which include variable 
input prices, variable output quantities and fixed netputs (inputs and outputs). It arises due to 
technical inefficiency, which results in the use of an excess or sub-optimal mix of inputs 
given input prices and output quantities. The value of cost inefficiency can be equal to or 
greater than one. It is equal to one for the best-practice commercial bank within the given 
sample. If it is greater than one, then the bank is thought of as wasting a certain proportion of 
its resources relative to a best practice bank facing the same condition. Thus, the higher the 
value of the cost inefficiency, the greater the inefficiency. For example, a value of 1.17 
implies that a bank has costs that are 17 per cent above minimum defined by the frontier. It 
also means that 17 per cent of its costs are wasted relative to the ‘best-practice’ commercial 
bank producing the same output and facing the same conditions. 
2.3  Why should cost efficiency or profit efficiency be important? 
The reasons why cost efficiency or profit efficiency is important, is basically based on the 
efficiency concept by Farrel (1957) that a bank seeks cost and profit optimization. As Bbank 
managers tend to be cost minimizers as well as profit maximizers, so profit and cost 
efficiency should be regarded as important.  
                                                 
3
 Another parametric but more rarely used technique is the so-called thick frontier approach (TFA). This 
approach divided banks into four quartiles regarding their average cost or profit. Then the cost or profit curve is 
estimated separately for all groups of the banks. The estimated cost/profit function for banks in the 
smallest/largest average cost/profit quartile is interpreted as the cost/profit efficient frontier. A disadvantage of 
the TFA is that the result is very sensitive to the selection on the number of quantiles. In addition econometric 
problems may arise since the banks are pre-sorted using average cost or profit, which are essentially dependent 
variables. 
4
 Nevertheless, there is no consensus among the researchers on the efficiency concept, functional form and 
estimation technique that yield the most accurate efficiency measure. 5 
 
In terms of financial and accounting ratios, improving profit efficiency can increase net 
interest income and it leads to increasing the net interest margin. In general, improving profit 
efficiency will also contribute to increasing loans and investments. Similarly, improving cost 
efficiency can increase the net interest margin because increased cost efficiency will lead to 
lower interest rates on consumer deposits as the bank’s and/or financial institution’s demand 
for money declines. The Net Interest Margin (NIM) is the difference between the interest 
income produced by a bank’s earning assets (loans and investments) and its major expense—
theinterest paid to its depositors. The net difference between interest earned and interest paid 
is a key measure of bank profitability as well. 
3  Empirical model and data 
3.1  Stochastic frontier approach 
Estimating cost inefficiency 
To estimate the cost and alternative profit frontier functions, a transcendental logarithmic 
functional form is selected. This functional form is widely used because it is a flexible 
functional form. The study uses the translog stochastic frontier functions by Battese and 
Coelli (1995) and the software, Front 4.1, which was produced by Coelli (1996). According 
to this approach, the estimation of banks’ relative efficiency using panel data is obtained by 
estimating a cost function of the general form: 
 
       ist Y =β ist X + ist V + ist U           ( 1 )  
 
where  ist Y  is total cost in logarithm form of bank i in country s in period t;  ist X  is a matrix of 
outputs, inputs, netputs and the set of relevant independent variables in logarithm form; β  is 
an vector of unknown parameters;  ist V  is a random error term assumed to follow a symmetric 
normal distribution ( i V 〜idd 
2 , 0 ( ε σ N )) and  ist U  is the value of inefficiency to extract and is 
determined by a set of environmental variables Z.  
 
This study employs the full form of cost function which is expressed as follows: 
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 6 
where  i TC
5 is defined as the total cost;  i W  is a vector of input prices;  i Q  is a vector of variable 
outputs; and  i Z  is a vector of fixed netputs. These two models of (1) and (2) are simultaneously 
estimated by using maximum likelihood estimation; the methodology was advanced by Battese 
and Coelli (1995). The unknown parameters such as α , β , γ , δ , η , and φ  are 
estimated.Estimating profit efficiency 
To estimate profit efficiency of banks, the study uses the translog stochastic frontier profit 
function by Battese and Coelli (1995) and the software, Front 4.1, which was produced by 
Coelli (1996). According to this approach, the estimation of banks’ relative efficiency using 
panel data is obtained by estimating a profit function of the general form: 
 
       ist Y =β ist X + ist V - ist U           ( 3 )  
 
where  ist Y  is total profit in logarithm form of bank i in country s in period t;  ist X  is a matrix 
of outputs, inputs, netputs and the set of relevant independent variables in logarithm form; β  
is an vector of unknown parameters;  ist V  is a random error term assumed to follow a 
symmetric normal distribution ( i V 〜idd 
2 , 0 ( ε σ N )) and  ist U  is the value of inefficiency to 
extract and is determined by a set of environmental variables Z.  
 
This study employs the full form of profit equation as follows: 
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where  i π  is defined as profit before tax; θ  denotes absolute value of the minimum value of 
profit (π ) over all banks in the sample to avoid negative profit (which is inappropriate for the 
logarithmic form);  i W  is a vector of input prices;  i Q  is a vector of variable outputs; and  i Z  is 
a vector of fixed netputs. These two models of (1) and (2) are simultaneously estimated by 
using maximum likelihood estimation; the methodology was advanced by Battese and Coelli 
(1995). The unknown parameters such as α , β , γ , δ , η , and φ  are estimated.  
 
For this profit function, the dependent variable is the total profit of each commercial bank. As 
shown in Appendix Table 2, this study specifies three outputs: Loans ($M), other earning 
assets ($M) and off-balance sheet items ($M); two inputs: price of funds and price of non-
interest expenses; and two netputs, namely fixed assets and equity. The price of funds is 
computed by dividing total interest expenses by the total amount of deposits and short term 
funding, while the price of non-interest expenses is defined as the ratio of overhead cost to 
fixed assets. All variables are expressed in real terms using the consumer price index (CPI) 
with 2000 as the base year. 
                                                 
5
 Total cost consists of loan loss provisions, interest expense and overheads comprising personnel expenses and 
other operating expenses. However, in some banks the total cost is interest expense and overheads. 7 
3.2  Explanatory variables and Tobit regressions 
To ascertain the factors which derive inefficiency in banks, the Tobit model is applied. At the 
same time, in order to address the endogeneity bias, instrumental variable Tobit (IVTobit) 
regressions are performed. This model has the strength of estimating equations whose 
dependent variable values are restricted within some range. The second stage in the empirical 
analysis of this study therefore involves the use of Tobit regressions with the dependent 
variables as the profit efficiency and cost efficiency scores, regressed on empirical proxies for 
regulatory variables such as bank specific and macroeconomic factors described in Appendix 
Table A2. This regression analysis allows for identification of the regulatory variables that 
are significant on bank efficiency, conditional on other bank-specific factors, as well as 
market environment and economic conditions. In this stage, the efficiency scores obtained 
from the SFA analysis are regressed on the environmental variables.  
 




i i i x y ε β + =
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∗
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0 = i y , otherwise 
  
where  i ε ~  ) , 0 (
2 σ N ,  i x and β  are vectors of explanatory variables and unknown parameters, 
respectively, while 
∗
i y  is a latent variable and  i y  is efficiency score obtained by SFA 
analysis.  
 
The Tobit regression takes the following model: 
 
jt Θ = jt jt jt jt jt jt jt NIM LNTA DR LR L B A B 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 4 2 β β β β β β β β + + + + + + +  
+ ct jt jt jt jt jt INFL OHDCTA NIETA NLTA EQTA LLPNIR 13 12 11 10 9 8 β β β β β β + + + + +  
+ jt ct ct ct ct ct FINDEP G CRPV PG RL ε β β β β β + + + + + 18 17 16 15 14  
where  jt Θ  is the profit efficiency or cost efficiency of the jth bank in period t obtained from 
stochastic frontier models, B2A is funding claims strategy (customer deposits/loans + other 
earning assets) of bank j in period t; B4 denotes agency cost which consists of the fixed assets 
divided by total assets of bank j in period t; L1 is leverage ratio comprising deposits and 
short-term funding divided by equity of bank j in period t;  LR is lending rates (interest 
revenue divided by average loan amount); DR is deposit rates (interest expenses divided by 
average deposit amount); LNTA is natural logarithm of total assets of bank j in period t; NIM, 
net interest margin is the difference between interest income (loans, securities, etc) and 
interest expense (deposits, borrowed funds, etc) of bank j in period t; LLPNIR is loan loss 
provisions divided by net interest revenue of bank j in period t; EQTA is equity divided by 
total assets of bank j in period t; NLTA is net loans divided by total assets of bank j in period 
t; NIETA is net interest expenses divided by total assets of bank j in period t; and OHDCTA is 
overhead cost divided by total assets of bank j in period t. Macroeconomic conditions include 
the following variables. INFL is inflation rate; RL is a governance indicator whose score 
ranges from -2.5 to 2.5; PG is real GDP per capita growth rate; CRPV is domestic credit to 
private sector (percentage of GDP); G is real GDP growth rate; and FINDEP is money and 8 
quasi money (M2) as percentage of GDP at country c in period t, respectively. Also,  0 β  is the 
intercept term,  18 2 1 ,..., , β β β  are coefficients and  jt ε  is the error term.  
Data descriptions and summary statistics 
An unbalanced and comprehensive bank-level panel dataset was used covering 29 SSA 
countries during 2000-07, obtained from the Bankscope database. Macro data came from the 
International Financial Statistics and World Development Indicators. The bank-level data 
used are mostly consolidated data from commercial banks. However, unconsolidated data 
were employed when consolidated data were not available. The number of observations and 
banks are 1,200 and 231, respectively. A foreign bank is defined as having at least 50 per cent 
foreign ownership;
6 ‘foreign ownership’ is classified as either SSA foreign or non-SSA 
foreign. An SSA foreign bank is  sub-Saharan Africa-oriented. Sub-Saharan Africa sub-
regional banks and Pan-African banks are classified as SSA foreign ownership in this study. 
A non-SSA foreign bank is one whose parent bank is based in a non-SSA region, mainly the 
OECD countries. Outliers in the data, such as extremely huge figures (e.g., Zimbabwe’s 2007 
bank-level data, which was affected by hyperinflation and inflationary distortions) and 
negative equity values were excluded.  
 
Using the Bankscope database has two major advantages. First, the coverage is fairly 
comprehensive, with sampled banks accounting for about 90 per cent of total assets in each 
country, according to the source. Second, the accounting information at the bank level is 
presented in standardized form, after making adjustments for differences in accounting and 
reporting standards across countries. On the other hand, the data has some limitations. First, 
there is a sample selection bias in favour of large banks which weakens somewhat its 
usefulness, as small banks may tend to be more financially constrained than large banks. 
Second, the data do not provide a breakdown of loan portfolios by sectors or by borrower 
types, precluding the use of controls for bank-specific changes in loan demand. Third, the 
data do not provide information on the currency composition of loans and deposits, which 
could be a potentially useful source of cross-sectional variation in the open economy context 
(Arena et al. 2006). 
 
Appendix Table A4 presents summary statistics of the variables used for SFA analysis. The 
average total assets of all banks during the sample period is US$884.89 million. Nevertheless, 
the observation number of small- and medium-sized banks in the sample whose total assets 
are less than US$500 million is 1,029 of 1,200 in total. This implies that the number of large 
banks is a very small in SSA. 
4 Empirical  results 
4.1  Financial and economic ratios 
This section gives a brief explanation of the accounting ratios while paying particular 
attention to the remarkable trend in the context of the African banking system. Table 1 
                                                 
6
 However, the ownership information provided by Bankscope has been shown to be inaccurate in many cases 
(Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt 2009). 9 
reports that the countries with a higher asset share of foreign banks tend to have more 
competitive domestic banks in some accounting ratios. For example, regarding EQTA (as a 
percentage) as a proxy of capital ratios, Burundi (48.7 per cent), Cote d'Ivoire (12 per cent), 
Mozambique (23.7 per cent), Senegal (19.6 percent), Swaziland (22.1 per cent) and Uganda 
(13.1 per cent) all have higher ratios of domestic banks than those of foreign banks. 
Cameroon and Zambia are the exceptions. On the contrary, the opposite trend holds true. 
That is, most of the countries with a lower foreign bank asset share tend to have less 
competitive domestic banks. It implies that the foreign bank entry appears to improve the 
capital ratios of domestic banks.  
 
NIETA measured as operations ratios represents the degree that NIETA varies among 
countries, but the countries with a high foreign bank asset share appear to have relatively 
more competitive domestic banks. These are Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Namibia and Zimbabwe. But a high NIETA ratio is expected to 
impact performance negatively because efficient banks are expected to operate at lower costs.  
 
Concerning asset quality ratios, namely loan loss provisions to net interest revenue, LLPNIR, 
the number of countries whose asset share of foreign banks is less than 70 per cent is 21, as 
shown in Table 1. The ratio of LLPNIR is higher in domestic banks than in foreign banks 
among 17 countries including Senegal, Cameroon, and Zambia, which are the countries 
whose asset share of foreign banks is more than 70 per cent. This implies that domestic banks 
in the sample may have a more serious problem with underperforming loans in their balance 
sheets compared to foreign banks. Also, foreign banks pursuing a profit maximization 
objective can be expected to have an incentive to assess more accurately borrowers’ credit 
worthiness and economize on loan loss provisions. 
 
Turning to the indicator of performance ratios, namely net interest margin (NIM), this is 
higher in domestic banks than in foreign banks. This suggests that foreign bank entry may 
contribute to improving the performance of domestic banks in nine countries in the sample 
whose asset share of foreign banks is more than 60 per cent. NIM is also regarded as a good 
baseline measurement of the profitability of a bank’s core lending and borrowing business; 
higher margins can be a sign of great management among banks in similar lines of business. 
On the other hand, it could lead to riskier lending policies. That is, narrower margins can 
suggest trouble on the deposit side and a higher cost of funds. Moreover, in terms of bank 
efficiency, higher levels of net interest margins, in general, indicate lower levels of bank 
efficiency.  
 
Regarding the liquidity ratios, the ratio of net loans to total assets (NLTA) is higher in 
domestic banks than that in foreign banks in 15 countries, as shown in Table 1. However, the 
opposite case holds true in the other 14 countries.  
 
CSTFTA is the ratio of customer deposits and short term funding to total assets which 
indicates the liquidity of banks. Looking at this ratio in Table 1, increasing the degree of 
foreign bank penetration will not improve the liquidity of domestic banks, while representing 
lower levels of CSTFTA in domestic banks than those of foreign banks. This was observed in 
nine out of the eleven countries with a high asset share of foreign banks (more than 65 per 
cent of total assets). 
 10 
Table 1: Accounting ratios, average (%) during 2000-07 
    Asset share of foreign banks 
(in % of total assets)     BTPTA  CIR  CSTFTA  EQNL  EQTA  LLPNIR  NIETA  NIM  NIRTA  NLTA  OHDCTA       






foreign      D  AllF D  AllF D  AllF D  AllF  D  AllF D  AllF D  AllF D  AllF D  AllF D  AllF D  AllF   No.obs 
Angola     59.6  59.6        1.8    4.8    120.8 84.6 86.6 81.0 43.8  36.9  7.9  12.6 135.3 23.2    3.6  3.1  4.1  10.0 14.0   18.7 35.9 4.5  4.0    15
Benin  63.3   63.3     0.3   2.6   80.1  51.8  86.1  86.9  25.4  81.4  10.4  10.8  29.7  80.9   2.3  1.6  6.0  7.5  1.9  2.2  43.6  24.4  5.2  5.3  22
Botswana  26.4    42.5  69.0      3.5    3.7    49.6 47.1  81.2  83.8  19.7 18.6 9.0 7.7 18.5 7.9    6.7 6.2 5.2 6.1 2.5 3.2 47.6  44.6  3.7 3.6  37
BurkinaFaso  28.4   23.2  51.5     1.7   1.1   64.7  62.4  86.4  85.6  16.3  13.3  8.3  8.1  27.6  30.4   1.7  2.4  5.5  6.0  2.2  2.1  51.5  61.5  5.4  5.0 49
Burundi  58.3   38.4  96.7     4.2   4.3   80.9 60.5  63.5  82.9  168.5  19.5  48.7  9.7  2.4  25.8   6.2  4.1  8.5  6.1  4.1  2.8  25.8  53.1  5.4  4.7  16
Cameroon  7.5   82.1  89.6     0.4   2.4   81.3 34.0  87.1  84.8  14.5  15.5  6.2  7.7  27.3  15.8   3.0  2.2  3.2  4.2  1.3  1.2  42.7  50.8  4.4  2.6  31
CapeVerde    56.3  56.3      1.9    0.5    62.1 71.5  88.0  86.9  14.3 18.2 8.6 8.8 17.0 5.8    3.0 2.4 5.2 5.9 1.6  59.8  50.4  3.1 3.6  12
Coted'Ivoire  24.7   65.6  90.3     1.2   1.3   70.3  65.5  80.0  83.8  17.5  14.7  12.0  9.2  17.6  28.2   2.9  2.3  8.3  5.3  3.0  1.8  69.7  62.5  7.1 5.8  48
Gambia  6.9   55.2  62.1     9.9   6.1   34.7  57.7  77.6  80.5  34.5  35.5  11.7  9.7  20.6  6.1   4.5  2.6  8.5  8.7  3.6  2.9  34.3  29.6  5.0  8.3  18
Ghana  1.3    42.2  43.5     3.8    4.5    64.7  63.2 70.0 75.9 26.0  73.5  9.4  12.9 14.5  11.0    5.4  4.7  12.3 11.5 7.5  3.4  38.5 29.3 8.3  7.1  48
Kenya  4.8   49.8  54.6     2.3   3.0   63.0  71.8  74.9  71.8  37.5  40.1  18.2  19.7  30.4  9.5   4.2  1.8  7.5  8.8  3.3  2.4  51.9  49.3  5.6  5.6  148 
Malawi  35.9    35.9     8.5    3.4    43.5  64.3 74.7 79.6 52.9  55.0  15.6 13.3 1.8  24.5    5.4  7.5  13.9 13.7 7.8  6.1  30.2 29.8 7.6  10.3  30
Mali  60.3    0.6  60.9      1.3    1.9    69.5 63.7  86.2  88.3  16.3 14.0 9.4 7.8 28.8 32.5    1.1 1.5 6.3 6.0 2.2 2.0 58.4  56.0  4.1 5.4  27
Mauritania    8.9  8.9     2.1    2.3    57.0  65.0 61.2 47.0 26.1  124.3 14.1 39.2 49.0  12.8    1.0  0.7  7.3  7.0  2.8  54.5 38.9 4.3  7.9  10
Mauritius  1.1    30.9  32.0      2.8    0.8    48.9 53.2  83.1  83.9  18.0 34.3 9.7 11.4  34.4 7.4    4.2 3.8 4.3 3.0 1.9 0.9 59.9  51.9  2.3 1.5 49
Mozambique  26.6   70.3  96.9     5.2   4.1   45.5  88.8  71.9  81.6  37.1  37.7  23.7  10.2  11.1  54.3   2.3  3.7  7.9  8.4  5.5  4.2  66.1  33.3  4.6 7.3  37
Namibia  62.3   62.3     3.0   3.0   55.6  56.5  84.0  84.2  13.5  12.2  11.2  9.2  8.6  7.5   5.2  5.2  5.5  5.5  2.4  2.4  83.7  75.3  4.4  4.3  16
Niger  65.9   65.9     2.3   0.9   89.3  88.4  79.3  86.5  28.4  19.3  15.3  8.9  -25.0  10.9   1.3  1.8  7.3  5.5  2.9  1.9  53.9  52.6  9.2  6.8  22
Nigeria  12.0   2.7  14.6     3.0   3.4   63.2  65.0  72.2  66.9  40.8  55.4  12.8  16.5  27.3  16.6   5.2  4.2  9.3  10.4  4.3  4.4  33.2  30.4  7.3  8.5 157 
Senegal  11.8   79.7  91.5     2.0   2.0   64.3  60.2  68.5  85.6  33.8  22.0  19.6  9.4  36.1  13.9   1.7  2.1  6.2  5.9  1.1  1.4  58.2  54.9  3.3  4.3 44
Seychelles  37.0    28.0  65.0      4.8    2.5    17.8 48.9  92.4  88.8  21.0 20.5 5.5 7.9 1.1  9.6    1.1 1.2 3.5 6.5 1.5 1.7 26.5  38.7  1.0 2.4 10
SierraLeone  2.2    29.7  31.8     7.7    11.9    56.4  40.6 71.8 74.4 105.0 144.9 20.1 13.6 12.0  2.0   1.5  1.1  14.6 11.6 5.0  4.0  23.5 11.3 10.7 8.0  31
SouthAfrica    43.1  43.1      2.9    1.9    63.8 63.2  58.6  86.0  29.7 15.5 16.1  7.3 23.1 8.1    5.1 4.0 8.7 6.0 3.6  62.7  61.5  6.9 4.3  53
Sudan    32.7  32.7     1.8    2.0    53.4  70.3 68.3 57.3 10.2  104.2 6.9  12.3 98.8  11.4    3.0  1.0  4.4  8.9  0.9  68.7 38.9 4.3  5.4  22
Swaziland  80.8   80.8     3.6   3.8   88.6  68.1  42.4  85.9  30.2  14.6  22.1  9.2  -4.7  3.3   1.9  3.9  7.3  6.8  3.0  3.3  60.2  63.0  7.5  6.8  30
Tanzania  17.3    28.3  45.5      2.5    2.8    62.1 60.1  84.8  83.9  29.6 30.8 9.2 11.7  11.2 13.8    2.1 2.3 6.5 7.4 2.6 2.8 37.5  42.6  4.2 5.0 48
Uganda  31.8    60.3  92.1     4.2    4.0    60.6  57.4 76.7 80.4 33.5  36.5  13.1 12.4 5.4  10.9    2.5  2.3  15.1 11.3 5.8  5.4  39.7 39.7 9.3  6.1 77
Zambia  14.8   56.3  71.1     5.3   5.5   94.3  73.3  74.5  74.5  44.5  58.0  10.9  12.9  51.6  26.7   3.2  3.3  6.9  8.2  6.7  6.3  39.1  35.6  9.8  8.6 68
Zimbabwe  18.3   43.7  61.9       7.8    12.9    47.4  39.4 77.7 72.5 35.2  47.5  10.6 12.9 13.7  2.6   14.8 8.0  26.6 40.2 70.5 63.7 32.8 36.9 8.5  8.8    25
Note: Asset share of foreign banks does not always represent real asset share of foreign banks to the whole banking sector since these values were computed using the number of 
observations (1,200 observations and 231 banks) of sample data. Blank denotes that the data are not available. D and AllF represent domestic banks and all foreign banks, 
respectively. See Table A1 in the appendix for the definition of each accounting ratios. 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Bankscope database (2008, 2009).  
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Table 2: Accounting ratios, average (%) during 2000-07 
    Asset share of foreign banks 
(in % of total assets)  BTPTA  CIR CSTFTA  EQNL EQTA  LLPNIR  NIETA NIM NIRTA  NLTA  OHDCTA   






foreign SSA NSSA  SSA NSSA SSA NSSA  SSA NSSA SSA NSSA SSA NSSA SSA NSSA SSA NSSA SSA NSSA SSA NSSA SSA NSSA No.obs 
Angola     59.6 59.6    4.8   84.6  81.0  36.9  12.6  23.2   3.1  10.0  55.9  35.9  4.0   9 
Benin   63.3   63.3  2.6     51.8  86.9  81.4  10.8  80.9    1.6  7.5  2.2  24.4  5.3    8 
Botswana   26.4   42.5  69.0  3.4   3.9   49.5  45.3  83.1  84.2  12.7  23.0  6.9  8.3  8.3  7.5   6.0  6.4  6.5  5.9  3.2  2.9  49.9  40.7  3.7  3.5   21 
Burkina 
Faso   28.4   23.2  51.5  2.0   0.2   55.7  70.0  88.2  82.6  11.2  15.6  6.3  10.0  24.3  37.3   2.2  2.5  5.8  6.2  2.1  2.5  57.4  66.2  4.3  5.8   34 
Burundi   58.3   38.4  96.7  4.5   3.9   46.1 79.6  80.9  85.7  22.7  15.3  11.1  7.8  34.7  14.0   4.1  4.1  7.4  4.5  2.8  4.0  53.1  53.0  4.6  4.7   14 
Cameroon   7.5   82.1  89.6  1.7   2.5   28.8  35.5  88.6  83.8  8.8  17.3  5.3  8.3  35.0  10.6   2.7  2.1  3.4  4.4  1.2  1.9  60.5  48.1  2.0  2.8   28 
Cape Ver.     56.3  56.3    0.5   71.5  86.9  18.2  8.8  5.8   2.4  5.9  1.3  50.4  3.6   6 
Cote d'Iv.   24.7   65.6  90.3  1.1   1.4   57.6  71.8  87.0  81.2  9.8  18.7  6.1  11.6  41.2  17.8   2.6  2.0  5.2  5.4  1.8  2.2  62.1  62.8  5.4  6.2   36 
Gambia   6.9   55.2  62.1  2.4   8.2   76.8  46.8  79.6  80.9  46.4  29.3  11.8  8.5  14.2  1.4   2.9  2.5  6.3  10.1  2.9  4.7  27.5  30.8  9.8  7.4   11 
Ghana   1.3   42.2  43.5  -2.2   5.3   150.5  52.3  89.7  74.1  29.4  79.0  7.2  13.6  11.5  11.0   3.3  4.9  6.6  12.1  3.4  7.1  32.2  28.9  7.5  7.0  18 
Kenya   4.8   49.8  54.6  1.3   4.7   55.8  86.9  59.3  83.6  55.7  25.5  29.4  10.5  14.0  5.4   2.1  1.5  9.8  7.9  2.4  3.9  48.8  49.9  4.8  6.3   33 
Malawi    35.9    35.9  3.4      64.3 79.6  55.0 13.3 24.5    7.5 13.7  6.1 29.8 10.3    16 
Mali   60.3   0.6  60.9  2.1   -1.6   59.0  138.5  88.9  78.6  13.2  26.0  7.3  15.6  32.5    1.5  1.6  6.0  6.6  2.0  1.7  55.7  60.1  5.2  8.2   17 
Mauritania     8.9  8.9    2.3   65.0  47.0  124.3  39.2  12.8   0.7  7.0  2.0  38.9  7.9   3 
Mauritius    1.1   30.9  32.0  1.7    0.7    21.9  57.1  74.2  85.1  157.1  19.0  24.5 9.8  2.7 8.0    1.9 4.1  5.4 2.7  0.9 1.0  16.5  56.3  0.5 1.6   36 
Mozamb.  26.6   70.3  96.9  3.7   4.3   60.0  99.8  84.5  80.5  47.5  33.9  9.8  10.3  8.2  71.8   1.8  4.4  6.2  9.3  4.2  4.1  21.3  37.8  4.9  8.2   29 
Namibia   62.3   62.3  3.0     56.5  84.2  12.2  9.2  7.5    5.2  5.5  2.4  75.3  4.3    10 
Niger   65.9   65.9  0.9     88.4  86.5  19.3  8.9  10.9    1.8  5.5  1.9  52.6  6.8    17 
Nigeria   12.0   2.7  14.6  3.9   3.0   61.3  68.7  73.6  60.2  48.4  62.4  15.5  17.4  16.7  16.5   4.9  3.5  9.0  11.8  4.4  4.8  32.7  28.1  7.7  9.4   28 
Senegal   11.8   79.7  91.5  1.2   2.4   70.1 54.6  87.4  84.6  31.6  16.7  9.7  9.2  13.8  13.9   1.9  2.2  4.3  6.8  1.4  2.7  49.2  58.1  4.3  4.4   39 
Seychelles   37.0   28.0  65.0  2.4   2.6   51.4  42.5  88.3  89.9  19.9  21.9  8.7  5.7  12.4  2.5   1.2  1.0  7.8  3.5  1.7  1.5  43.6  26.4  2.6  2.0   7 
Sierra L.   2.2   29.7  31.8  3.8   13.9   71.9  32.8  83.3  72.2  76.2  162.0  12.3  13.9  12.8  -0.7   0.9  1.1  9.4  12.2  4.0  4.9  17.0  9.9  11.5 7.2    10 
S. Africa     43.1  43.1    1.9   63.2  86.0  15.5  7.3  8.1   4.0  6.0  2.3  61.5  4.3   28 
Sudan     32.7  32.7    2.0   70.3  57.3  104.2  12.3  11.4   1.0  8.9  1.9  38.9  5.4   12 
Swaziland   80.8   80.8  3.8     68.1  85.9  14.6  9.2  3.3    3.9  6.8  3.3  63.0  6.8    22 
Tanzania   17.3   28.3  45.5  1.9   3.3   67.5  55.2  84.0  83.9  27.3  33.1  12.1  11.4  21.7  8.8   2.1  2.4  7.9  7.1  2.8  2.7  46.6  39.9  5.9  4.5   33 
Uganda   31.8   60.3  92.1  4.3   3.9   65.2  54.9  83.0  79.5  32.6  37.7  9.7  13.3  3.0  13.4   1.8  2.5  13.5  10.6  5.4  4.2  32.1  42.1  7.9  5.5  59 
Zambia   14.8   56.3  71.1  4.4   6.0   80.8  70.0  68.6  77.1  29.3  70.5  12.4  13.1  56.5  13.7   4.2  3.0  6.0  9.1  6.3  7.6  45.8  31.1  8.9  8.4  46 
Zimbabwe   18.3   43.7  61.9  14.6   10.4   38.1  41.4  68.6  78.4  62.2  25.5  15.2  9.4  2.9  2.2   10.4  4.4  42.0  37.5  63.7  63.6  36.3  37.8  9.8 7.2    10 
Note: Asset share of foreign banks does not always represent real asset share of foreign banks to the whole banking sector since these values were computed using the number of 
observations (1,200 observations and 231 banks) of sample data. Blank denotes that the data are not available. SSA and NSSA denote sub-Saharan African foreign banks and non-
sub-Saharan African foreign banks, respectively. See Table A1 in the appendix for the definition of each accounting ratios. 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Bankscope database (2008, 2009).  
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With regard to the BTPTA ratio, measured as a proxy of profitability, Table 2 reports that in 
three countries, Burundi (58.3 per cent), Mali (60.3 per cent) and Burkina Faso (28.4 per 
cent), which have a higher asset share of SSA foreign banks than that of non-SSA foreign 
banks, the ratio of BTPTA of SSA foreign banks is higher than that of non-SSA foreign 
banks. It implies that with regard to profitability, SSA foreign banks tend to perform better 
than non-SSA foreign banks in these countries. 
 
OHDCTA (overhead costs to total assets) is used as an indictor of operations and measure of 
efficiency. Higher levels of OHDCTA indicate lower levels of banking efficiency, given that 
banks incur higher costs and there exists a higher wedge between lending and deposit interest 
rates. Table 1 indicates that eight countries, whose asset share of foreign banks is more than 
65 per cent of total assets, appear to have a higher OHDCTA in domestic banks than that of 
foreign banks. This implies that a high presence of foreign banks will not contribute to the 
improvement of cost efficiency of domestic banks.  
 
The cost income ratio (CIR) is an indicator of banking efficiency; it measures the overhead 
costs relative to gross revenues, with higher ratios indicating lower levels of cost efficiency. 
As shown in Table 1, most countries with high asset share of foreign banks tend to have a 
higher CIR in domestic banks than that of foreign banks. This implies that a high presence of 
foreign banks will not lead to the improvement of efficiency of domestic banks.  
4.2 SFA  results 
Efficiency by the type of ownership: domestic, SSA (sub-Saharan African) foreign, or non-SSA foreign 
As shown in the Figure 1 with an average profit efficiency score of 0.77 during 2000-07, SSA 
foreign banks are the most profit efficient. Non-SSA foreign banks (with a score of 0.72) are 
also more profit efficient than domestic ones (at 0.66). The findings of this study suggest that 
foreign banks tend to be more profit efficient than domestic banks. Looking at the average 
efficiency of banks by each year during the estimated period, the average profit efficiency of 
all three types of banks almost has the same trend, while the domestic banks have shown the 
lowest average profit efficiency for the whole period. There appears to exist the same 
difference of average profit efficiency among each type of bank during each year. 
Interestingly, in terms of this estimation by the SFA, it may imply that the mean profit 
efficiency of domestic banks has moved similarly, depending on the movement of average 
profit efficiency of foreign banks. It may also suggest that the higher profit efficiency of 
foreign banks will contribute to improving the profit efficiency of domestic banks. Yet, on the 
whole, the banks in all three groups appear to have been less profit efficient since 2005. 
 
Regarding the cost inefficiency shown in the Figure 2, in general, there was a relatively big 
improvement in the cost efficiency of domestic and SSA foreign banks for the period 2000-
04, though the cost inefficiency of the two types of banks has shown an upward and 
downward trend for the period 2004-07. Moreover, the unique trend is that non-SSA foreign 
banks tend to be the most cost efficient during 2000-02. Nevertheless, its trend has reversed 
from 2003, given the picture that non-SSA foreign banks tend to be the least cost efficient. On 












Domestic 0.693 0.667 0.670 0.676 0.651 0.652 0.643 0.616 
SSA Foreign 0.796 0.757 0.776 0.772 0.770 0.769 0.764 0.724 
Non-SSA Foreign 0.742 0.712 0.729 0.734 0.716 0.723 0.713 0.675 
All Foreign 0.763 0.730 0.749 0.750 0.737 0.741 0.735 0.697 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 
Note: Average values for 2000-07: all banks (0.719); domestic banks (0.659); SSA Foreign (0.764); non-SSA 
Foreign (0.717); and All Foreign (0.736). Total number of observations and banks are 1,200 and 231, 
respectively.  
Source: Author's calculation using data from Bankscope (2009). 









Domestic 1.066 1.056 1.058 1.048 1.047 1.059 1.060 1.057 
SSA Foreign 1.062 1.060 1.056 1.047 1.043 1.054 1.052 1.044 
Non-SSA Foreign 1.055 1.047 1.044 1.052 1.066 1.070 1.076 1.079 
All Foreign 1.058 1.052 1.049 1.050 1.057 1.064 1.065 1.064 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 
Note: Average values for 2000-07: all banks (1.057); domestic banks (1.056); SSA Foreign (1.051); non-SSA 
Foreign (1.063); and All Foreign (1.058). Total number of observations and banks are 1,200 and 231, 
respectively. 
Source: Author's calculation using data from Bankscope (2009). 
 
In neighbouring countries of South Africa, such as Swaziland, Botswana, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe, all banks which have at least 50 per cent foreign ownership from SSA are based in 
South Africa. With respect to other SSA foreign-owned banks, as shown in Tables 3 and 4 
regarding foreign banks and home countries where parent foreign banks operate, SSA foreign 
banks in the West African region are based in Togo and Nigeria. The SSA foreign banks in 
East Africa are based in Kenya and South Africa. The remarkably interesting result of this 
study is that the above-mentioned SSA foreign banks are more profit efficient than both 
domestic and non-SSA foreign banks.  14 
















































































































































































































































 Note: From the left-hand side, of the graph sample countries are put in order from the country with the highest 
profit efficiency scores of domestic banks to the country with the lowest scores. 
Source: Author's calculation using data from Bankscope (2008, 2009). 
















































































































































































































































 Note: From the left-hand side, of the graph sample countries are ordered from the country with the most to the 
country with the least cost efficient domestic banks. 
Source: Author's calculation using data from Bankscope (2008, 2009). 
 
In Figure 3 and Appendix Table A3, looking at the average profit efficiency of all three types 
of banks by country, the foreign banks are more profit efficient than domestic banks in 16 
countries. These countries are Burkina Faso (efficiency score: 0.878), Cameroon (0.838), 
Gambia (0.908), Malawi (0.837), Mali (0.902), Mauritius (0.760), Namibia (0.491), Niger 
(0.915), Nigeria (0.469), Senegal (0.872), Sierra Leone (0.85), South Africa (0.517), Sudan 
(0.834), Swaziland (0.789), Tanzania (0.744) and Zambia (0.625). Particularly interesting is 
the trend that the countries with large banks tend to have low profit efficiency scores of banks, 
for example, in Botswana, Namibia, Nigeria and South Africa. In contrast, countries with 15 
small banks tend to have high profit efficiency. In addition, SSA foreign banks tend to be 




The results of the cost inefficiency estimates show that SSA foreign banks or non-SSA 
foreign ones are more cost efficient than domestic banks in 16 countries during the sample 
period (as seen in Figure 4 and Appendix Table A3). Particularly, non-SSA foreign banks 
tend to be more cost efficient than other banks in 10 of the 16 countries, namely Burkina Faso 
(1.031), Burundi (1.053), Cote d’Ivoire (1.036), Mali (1.026), Mozambique (1.038), 
Seychelles (1.019), Sierra Leone (1.015), Tanzania (1.038), Uganda (1.036) and Zimbabwe 
(1.069). Nevertheless, on the whole, there is not such a big difference of cost inefficiency 
among all banks. 
 
Figure 5 reports the asset share of foreign banks revealing that countries such as Mozambique, 
Burundi, Uganda, Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Swaziland, Zambia and Botswana (69 
per cent foreign asset share) hold a high presence of foreign-owned banks with more than 70 
per cent foreign asset share. Figure 5 and Appendix Table A3 suggest that the countries with a 
high asset share of foreign banks, more than about 70 per cent of total assets, have relatively 
more competitive domestic banks than foreign banks in terms of some financial accounting 
ratios such as EQTA, LLPNIR, and NIETA.  
Figure 5: Asset share of foreign banks (in percentage of total assets), 2000-07 
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Note: The sample data of 231 commercial banks covering 29 sub-Saharan African countries were used.  
The number of foreign banks is 121. See Appendix Table A3 for details. 
Source: Author’s calculations using Bankscope database (2009). 
 
The empirical results obtained in this study, especially those showing that SSA foreign banks 
are more profit efficient than non-SSA foreign banks, are consistent with the findings of 
Claessens and Van Horen (2009). In this regard, after controlling for the level of income of the 
home country of the foreign bank, SSA foreign banks that are geographically and culturally close, 
have on average a higher profitability than non-SSA foreign banks that are geographically and 
culturally distant. Thus, it is important to note that SSA foreign banks (see Tables 3 to 4) whose 
headquarters are in South Africa, Togo and Nigeria seem to play a key role for financial development 
in many SSA countries with underdeveloped financial systems.  
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 Those eight countries are Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, 
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Table 3: Countries with concentrated foreign banking assets in sub-Saharan Africa (1) 
   Main  Foreign  Banks 
Home Countries of 
Foreign Banks  Ownership Type 
 Angola   Angolan Development Bank   Portugal  Non-SSA 
    Espiritu Santo Bank of Angola (BESA)  Portugal  Non-SSA 
    Totta Angola Bank (BTA)  Portugal  Non-SSA 
 Benin   Ecobank  Togo  SSA (Pan African Banks) 
 Botswana   Barclays Bank of Botswana   United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
    Standard Chartered Bank Botswana   United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
    Bank of Baroda (Botswana) Limited  India  Non-SSA 
    First National Bank of Botswana   South Africa  SSA 
    Stanbic Bank Botswana Limited  South Africa  SSA 
    Standard Chartered Bank Botswana Ltd  South Africa  SSA 
 Burkina Faso   Société Générale de Banques au Burkina - SGBB  France  Non-SSA 
    Ecobank  Togo  SSA (Pan African Banks) 
    Bank of Africa - Burkina    SSA (Pan African Banks) 
 Burundi   Banque de Crédit de Bujumbura  Belgique  Non-SSA 
 Cameroon  
Banque International du Cameroun pour l'Epargne 
et le Crédit (BICEC)   France Non-SSA 
   Société  Générale    France  Non-SSA 
   Citibank  Cameroun  Plc  USA  Non-SSA 
    Standard Chartered Bank Cameroon SA  United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
    Ecobank   Togo  SSA (Pan African Banks) 
 Cape Verde   Banco Comercial Atlantico   Portugal  Non-SSA 
   Banco  Interatlantico    Portugal  Non-SSA 
    Banco Caboverdiano de negocios   Portugal  Non-SSA 
 Cote d'Ivoire   Société Générale   France  Non-SSA 
    Banque Internationale pour le Commerce & 
l'Industrie en Cote d'Ivoire (BICICI)   Belgium Non-SSA 
    Citibank  USA Non-SSA 
    Bank of Africa - Côte d'Ivoire    SSA (Pan African Banks) 
    Ecobank  Togo  SSA (Pan African Banks) 
 Gambia   Standard Chartered Bank Gambia Limited  United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
    Guaranty Trust Bank (Gambia) Limited  Nigeria  SSA 
 Ghana   Barclays Bank   United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
    Standard Chartered Bank   United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
   SSB  Bank    France  Non-SSA 
    Zenith Bank (Ghana) Limited  Nigeria SSA 
 Kenya   Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd  United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
    Standard Chartered Bank Kenya  United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
   Habib  Bank  Limited  Pakistan  Non-SSA 
    Stanbic Bank Kenya Limited  South Africa  SSA 
    Bank of Africa Kenya Limited      SSA (Pan African Banks) 
 Malawi   Nedbank (Malawi) Ltd   South Africa  SSA 
    Standard Bank Limited   South Africa  SSA 
 Mali   Banque Sahélo-Saharienne pour l'Investissement et 
le Commerce (BSIC) Mali  Lybia Non-SSA 
    Ecobank  Togo  SSA (Pan African Banks) 
    Bank of Africa - Mali      SSA (Pan African Banks) 
Note: Only those countries for which the share of banking system assets held by foreign banks exceeds 50 per cent are shown. 
Some foreign bank data are not used for the SFA analysis due to lack of other necessary data.  
Source: Adapted from IMF, Regional Economic Outlook, April 2009; sub-Saharan Africa and other data are based on the 
shareholder information from Bankscope.  
 
Claessens and Van Horen (2009) also find that foreign banks that have operated for more than 
eight years in the country have the best performance, after investigating whether the time a 
foreign bank has been active in the host country has an impact on its performance. 
Furthermore, competition in the foreign bank’s home country does not affect the performance 17 
of the bank but competition in the host country does have an impact. Claessens and Van 
Horen (2009) point out that when competition in the host country is limited, foreign banks are  
more likely to out-perform domestic banks. That is, when competition is limited, it will be 
easier for a bank to generate excess returns and thus make a larger profit. Other host country 
characteristics (the level of overall and financial sector development) do not matter much for 
the relative performance of a foreign bank. 
Table 4: Countries with concentrated foreign banking assets in sub-Saharan Africa (2) 
    Main Foreign Banks  Home Countries of
 Foreign Banks  Ownership Type 
 Mauritania   Chinguitty Bank  Lybia  Non-SSA 
 Mauritius   Barclays Bank United   United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
    Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation (HSBC) Mauritius Ltd.   United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
    Standard Chartered Bank   United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
    Indian Ocean International Bank Ltd.  India Non-SSA 
    SBM Nedbank International Limited  South Africa (50%)  SSA 
 Mozambique   Banco Internacional de Mocambique (BIM)   Portugal  Non-SSA 
    Banco Comercial de Investimentos (BCI)-
Fomento   Portugal Non-SSA 
    Standard Bank   South Africa  SSA 
 Namibia   Standard Bank Namibia   South Africa  SSA 
    First National Bank   South Africa  SSA 
    Nedbank Namibia Ltd  South Africa  SSA 
 Niger   Ecobank   Togo  SSA (Pan African 
Banks) 
    Bank of Africa - Niger    SSA (Pan African 
Banks) 
 Nigeria   Standard Chartered Bank Nigeria  United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
    Société Générale Bank (Nigeria) Limited  France  Non-SSA 
    Habib Nigeria Bank Limited  Pakistan  Non-SSA 
   Ecobank    Togo SSA (Pan African 
Banks) 
 Senegal   Société Générale de Banques au Sénégal 
(SGBS)   France Non-SSA 
    Banque Internationale pour le Commerce et 
l'Industrie du Sénégal (B.I.C.I.S.)   France Non-SSA 
   Attijariwafa  Bank    Morocco  Non-SSA 
   Ecobank    Togo SSA (Pan African 
Banks) 
    Bank of Africa - Senegal    SSA (Pan African 
Banks) 
 Seychelles   Barclays Bank   United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
    Bank of Baroda   India  Non-SSA 
    Mauritius Commercial Bank (MCB)   Mauritius  SSA 
 Sierra Leone   Standard Chartered Bank Sierra Leone 
Limited  United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
    Guaranty Trust Bank (SL) Limited  Nigeria  SSA 
 South Africa   Absa Bank Ltd  United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
    HBZ Bank Limited  Pakistan  Non-SSA 
    Habib Overseas Bank Limited  Pakistan Non-SSA 
 Sudan   Byblos Bank Africa Ltd  Lebanon  Non-SSA 
 Swaziland   Standard Chartered Bank of Swaziland Ltd.   United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
    NedBank Swaziland Ltd.   South Africa  SSA 
    First National Bank Swaziland Ltd.   South Africa  SSA 
    Standard Bank Swaziland Limited   South Africa  SSA 
Note: Only those countries for which the share of banking system assets held by foreign banks exceeds 50 per 
cent are shown. Some foreign bank data are not used for the SFA analysis due to lack of other necessary data.  
Source: Adapted from IMF, Regional Economic Outlook, April 2009; sub-Saharan Africa and other data are based 
on the shareholder information from Bankscope.  18 
Table 5: Countries with concentrated foreign banking assets in sub-Saharan Africa (3) 
    Main Foreign Banks  Home Countries of
 Foreign Banks  Ownership Type 
 Tanzania   NBC Ltd.   United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
    Habib African Bank Ltd  Pakistan Non-SSA 
   Stanchart    United  Kingdom  Non-SSA 
    Barclays Bank   United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
    BOA Bank (Tanzania) Ltd     SSA (Pan African 
Banks) 
    Citibank Tanzania Limited  USA Non-SSA 
    Kenya Commercial Bank (Tanzania) Limited  Kenya  SSA 
    Diamond Trust Bank of Tanzania Ltd.  Kenya SSA 
    Stanbic Bank Tanzania  South Africa  SSA 
 Uganda   Barclays Bank of Uganda Limited  United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
   Citibank  Uganda  Limited  USA  Non-SSA 
    Standard Chartered Bank Uganda Limited  United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
    Bank of Baroda (Uganda) Limited  India  Non-SSA 
    Stanbic Bank Uganda Ltd  South Africa  SSA 
    Bank of Africa (Uganda) Ltd     SSA (Pan African 
Banks) 
 Zambia   Barclays Bank Zambia Plc   United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
    Citibank Zambia Ltd  USA  Non-SSA 
    Indo-Zambia Bank Limited  India (60%)  Non-SSA 
    SCBZ Plc-Standard Chartered Bank Zambia Plc  United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
    Stanbic Bank Zambia Limited  South Africa  SSA 
 Zimbabwe   Standard Chartered Bank Zimbabwe Ltd  United Kingdom  Non-SSA 
    Stanbic Bank Zimbabwe Limited  South Africa  SSA 
Note: Only those countries for which the share of banking system assets held by foreign banks exceeds 50 per 
cent are shown. Some foreign bank data are not used for the SFA analysis due to lack of other necessary data.  
Source: Adapted from IMF, Regional Economic Outlook, April 2009; sub-Saharan Africa and other data are based 
on the shareholder information from Bankscope.  
Efficiency by bank size (total assets) 
According to the sample data of the study, the banks whose total assets are more than US$1 
billion operate in only six countries: South Africa, Nigeria, Mauritius, Namibia, Kenya and 
Botswana. In the case of SSA banks, as shown in Tables 6, 7 and 8, roughly speaking the 
smaller the bank, the higher the profit efficiency. Among the banks, as indicated in Table 6, 
the medium domestic banks holding total assets within a range of US$100 million to below 
US$500 million  have the highest cost efficiency at 4.91 per cent, although the relatively large 
banks also have almost the same cost inefficiency, at 4.92 per cent, as that of medium banks.  
Table 6: Domestic banks (asset size, in US$ millions) 
Asset size  Average asset 
size 
No. of 
observations  Profit Efficiency (%)  Cost Inefficiency 
(%) 
< 100  43.51   275  76.23   5.91  
100 to < 500  239.64   192  62.88   4.91  
500 to < 1000  702.45   37  46.98   4.92  
1000 and 
above  9082.07   56  38.25   6.97  
Note: The bank size is classified in the sample as follows: Small Bank (< 100); Medium Bank (100 to < 500); 
Relatively Large Bank (500 to < 1000); Large Bank (1000 and above) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Bankscope database (2008)  
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In sub-Saharan African countries in the sample, the number of SSA foreign banks with total 
assets of more than US$500 million is small, indicating 20 observations (not the number of 
banks), while that of SSA foreign banks with total assets less than US$500 millionis very 
large indicating 242 observations. The trend for cost inefficiency is almost the same 
representing 4.93-5.38 per cent among SSA foreign banks except for the relatively large 
banks as presented in Table 7.  
 
In the case of non-SSA foreign banks, the large banks with total assets of US$1 billion or 
above tend to be the least cost efficient showing 10.69 per cent% (in Table 8). 
Table 7: SSA Foreign banks (asset size, in US$ millions) 
Asset size  Average asset 
size 
No. of 
observations  Profit Efficiency (%)  Cost Inefficiency 
(%) 
< 100  51.24   127  81.75   4.93  
100 to < 500  207.91   115  74.68   5.03  
500 to < 1000  596.08   10  60.58   9.00  
1000 and 
above  1663.73   10  44.38   5.38  
Note: The bank size is classified in the sample as follows: small bank (< 100); medium bank (100 to < 500); 
relatively large bank (500 to < 1000);  large bank (1000 and above). 
Source: Author’s calculations using Bankscope database (2008). 
 
The results of this analysis suggest that there seems to be a common trend in both domestic 
and non-SSA foreign banks. As shown in Table 8, the medium-sized or relatively large banks 
whose total assets are within the range of US$100 million to US$1 billion tend to be the most 
cost efficient. 
Table 8: Non-SSA foreign banks (asset size, in US$ millions) 
Asset size  Average asset 
size 
No. of 
observations  Profit Efficiency (%)  Cost Inefficiency 
(%) 
< 100  52.31   133  78.52   6.42  
100 to < 500  228.18   187  71.25   5.87  
500 to < 1000  704.06   39  64.70   5.39  
1000 and 
above  17852.78   19  42.78   10.69  
Note: The bank size is classified in the sample as follows: small bank (< 100); medium bank (100 to < 500); 
relatively large bank (500 to < 1000); large bank (1000 and above). 
Source: Author’s calculations using Bankscope database (2008). 
4.3 Main results of the second stage regressions (Tobit and IVTobit) 
Bank-specific factors 
The estimated results of the Tobit and IVTobit regressions are presented in Appendix Tables 
A7 to A10. The findings seem to suggest that B2A (funding claims strategy: customer 
deposits/loans + other earning assets, in per cent) has a consistently positive and significant 
impact on profit efficiency estimates of all types of banks. But B2A represents a negative and 20 
statistically significant relationship with cost efficiency estimates of domestic and all foreign 
banks. 
 
L1 indicated as leverage ratio, has a positive and significant impact on profit efficiency 
estimates of the domestic and SSA foreign banks, whereas the non-SSA foreign banks have 
shown a statistically significant inverse link with profit efficiency estimates. Contrary to 
expectations, L1 appears to have a negative and statistically significant relationship with cost 
efficiency estimates of domestic and SSA foreign banks, while showing a positive and 
significant impact on the cost efficiency of non-SSA foreign banks.  
 
The measure of the extent to which management uses funds for unproductive uses, B4 (fixed 
assets/total assets),
8 reveals a negative and statistically significant relationship with profit 
efficiency estimates of domestic banks (found only from the Tobit result) and SSA foreign 
ones. It implies that higher values of B4 will decrease the profit efficiency of commercial 
banks. The impact of B4 on profit efficiency of SSA foreign banks is quite large, given that 
the elasticity of profit efficiency with respect to B4 is considerably higher at -0.484 (Tobit), -
0.817 (IVTobit in the model that the variable of net interest margin is instrumented) and -
0.958 (IVTobit in the model that the variable of the ratio of overhead costs to total assets is 
instrumented). Thus, this empirical result supports the agency cost hypothesis.
9 Also contrary 
to expectations,  B4 has not shown any statistically significant relationship with profit 
efficiency in non-SSA foreign banks and cost efficiency in all three types of banks.  
 
NIETA, net interest expenses to total assets, is defined as an indicator for measuring bank 
management quality. As expected, NIETA reveals a negative and statistically significant (at 
the 1 per cent level) relationship with both profit and cost efficiency estimates in all three 
types of banks except for the case of SSA foreign banks indicating an insignificant link with 
cost efficiency. A high NIETA ratio is expected to impact performance negatively because 
efficient banks are expected to operate at lower costs. On the other hand, a lower NIETA ratio 
may impact performance positively because the use of new electronic technology like ATMs 
and other automated means of delivering services has caused a fall in the wage expenses. 
Nevertheless, NIETA is likely to have a positive and statistically significant association with 
cost efficiency of domestic banks.  
 
LNTA (natural logarithm of total assets) used as a proxy of a bank’s size, shows negative 
coefficients with statistical significance except for the case of cost efficiency estimates of all 
three types of banks, suggesting that the smaller the bank, the more profit efficient the bank 
will be. Thus, the case of SSA commercial banks does not support the economies of scale 
arguments that the larger the bank, the more efficient the bank will be. Regarding the cost 
efficiency, the result suggests that LNTA has a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with the cost efficiency only in non-SSA foreign banks and thereby it appears to 
support the economies of scale arguments.  
 
The NIM (Net Interest Margin) indicator of the operational performance reveals a negative 
and statistically significant relationship with profit efficiency of all three types of banks 
(found from the IVTobit results). NIM also exhibits a positive and statistically significant 
impact on cost efficiency of domestic and non-SSA foreign banks, indicating that the cost 
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 Some researchers argue that high leverage reduces agency costs and increases firm value by encouraging 
managers to act more in the interests of equity holders. This argument is known as the ‘agency costs hypothesis’. 21 
reduction will lead to a higher level of net interest margin. All these were observed at 1 per 
cent significance level in terms of IVTobit estimation. 
 
LLPNIR (loan loss provision to net interest revenue), indicating asset quality, reveals a 
positive and statistically significant relationship with profit efficiency estimates of non-SSA 
foreign banks. For domestic banks however, the indicator shows a negative and statistically 
significant relationship with profit efficiency. It implies that the improvement of profit 
efficiency leads to increasing banks’ loans in non-SSA foreign banks but improving bank 
efficiency contributes to a reduction of banks’ loans in domestic banks. It also implies that 
non-SSA foreign banks may have a more serious problem with underperforming loans. In 
addition, the only IVTobit result represents a negative and statistically significant link 
between LLPNIR and profit efficiency. Its impact is, however, quite small. 
 
The net loans-to-total assets (NLTA) ratio reveals a positive relationship with cost and profit 
efficiency of all three types of banks except for the link (showing negative and statistical 
significance) with cost efficiency of domestic banks. The obtained results are statistically 
significant (at the 1 per cent level). These findings, which are consistent with the findings by 
Sufian (2009), imply that both SSA and non-SSA foreign banks with higher net loans-to-asset 
ratios tend to have higher efficiency scores.  
 
EQTA has a negative and statistically significant (at the 1% level) relationships with profit 
efficiency of all three types of banks (excluding the IVTobit results of the models where net 
interest margin was instrumented) as well as cost efficiency of domestic banks. The findings 
seem to suggest that the more efficient banks use less equity and that the less efficient banks 
involved in riskier operations tend to hold more equity in the process. On the other hand, 
EQTA has a negative and statistically significant impact on the cost efficiency of domestic 
banks and non-SSA foreign banks (only in the IVTobit result of specification (5)). Regarding 
all foreign banks, EQTA appears to have a mixed result, showing a positive or negative and 
significant impact on the cost efficiency.  
 
OHDCTA (overhead costs to total assets) has a negative and statistically significant 
relationship with profit efficiency of all three types of banks. In contrast, there is a positive 
and statistically significant link with cost efficiency of domestic banks and non-SSA foreign 
ones. In SSA foreign banks, no significance level regarding the link with cost efficiency was 
obtained. The negative sign obtained for profit efficiency is as expected since higher levels of 
OHDCTA indicate lower levels of banking efficiency and this result implies that the lower 
OHDCTA leads to improving bank profit efficiency. But, in general, overhead costs of banks 
are mostly high in Africa since poor countries have typically higher overhead costs (Beck and 
Demirgüç-Kunt 2009).  
 
With regard to the lending interest rate (LR), LR has a negative and statistically significant 
relationship with profit efficiency of domestic banks and non-SSA foreign banks excluding 
the IVTobit result of specification (2). However, LR is positively correlated with profit 
efficiency of SSA foreign banks while representing statistical significance. In the case of cost 
efficiency, LR reveals a negative and statistically significant relationship with cost efficiency 
of domestic banks (found from IVTobit result of specification (2)) and SSA foreign banks 
(found from the Tobit result) but the previous empirical evidence shows a positive 
relationship between lower nominal interest rate in the economy and cost efficiency.
10 In most  
SSA countries, the lending rate is high, while showing a range of 17 to 31 per cent, on 
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average in the 29 sample countries in 2000. Although this lending rate has largely decreased 
to a range of 10 to 18 per cent in 2007,
11 it still remains relatively high. Thus, borrowers face 
high interest rates even more as the economy slows.  
 
DR (deposit interest rate) reveals a negative and statistically significant association with profit 
efficiency of domestic and non-SSA foreign banks. DR has a positive relationship with profit 
efficiency of SSA foreign banks but lacks statistical significance. In the case of cost 
efficiency, there appears to be a negative and statistically significant relationship for all 
foreign banks, in particular for non-SSA foreign banks. Conversely, domestic banks seem to 
have a positive and significant link between cost efficiency and deposit rate in terms of an 
empirical result of IVTobit analysis (in the case that net interest margin is instrumented). It 
implies that the more cost efficient the non-SSA foreign banks will be, the lower the deposit 
rate. However, some domestic banks may raise the deposit rate due to  improving cost 
efficiency. 
Macroeconomic factors 
Macroeconomic variables significantly affect bank profitability in Africa. Flamini et al. 
(2009) find a positive link between inflation and bank profits, suggesting that banks forecast 
future changes in inflation correctly and promptly enough to adjust interest rates and margins. 
The result of this study also finds a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
INFL and profit efficiency in all three types of banks, although in the case of foreign banks, 
only IVTobit results of the model, in which net interest margin is instrumented, indicate 
statistical significance. Besides, INFL reveals a statistically significant inverse effect on cost 
efficiency of domestic banks and non-SSA foreign ones (found only from the IVTobit result 
of specification (5) in Appendix Table A8).  
 
There is a positive and statistically significant link between G (real GDP growth rate) and 
profit efficiency of all three types of banks. This result implies that the more efficient bank, 
the higher the real GDP growth will be. RL (Rule of Law) has a positive and statistically 
significant (at the 1 per cent level) relationship with profit efficiency of all types of banks. It 
also suggests that the better the rule of law, the more profit efficient the bank will be. In 
contrast, RL seems to have a statistically significant and inverse impact on the cost efficiency 
only in the domestic banks.  
 
PG (real GDP per capita growth) has a negative and statistically significant relationship with 
profit efficiency of all three types of banks, suggesting that improvement of profit efficiency 
does not contribute to the growth of real GDP per capita. Also, the improvement of cost 
efficiency of domestic and non-SSA foreign banks will not lead to the growth of real GDP per 
capita since a statistically significant inverse relationship between cost efficiency and PG was 
observed. In contrast, there seems to be a positive relationship between PG and cost efficiency 
of domestic banks only according to the IVTobit result of the model where net interest margin 
is instrumented. 
 
CRPV (domestic credit to private sector, percentage of GDP) represents a negative and 
statistically significant relationship with profit efficiency of both domestic banks (excluding 
the case that the variable of net interest margin is instrumented in the IVTobit analysis) and 
non-SSA foreign banks as well as with cost efficiency of SSA foreign banks, implying that 
improvement of bank efficiency does not contribute to the growth of domestic credit to the 
private sector. This finding of the relationship between CRPV and bank efficiency may reflect 
the fact that bank lending to the private sector has been sluggish in most SSA countries, 
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limiting working capital and investments, particularly in agriculture as already mentioned in 
existing literature (e.g. in Christensen et al. 2006). Thus, this empirical result also implies that 
even if bank efficiency improves, it will not contribute to the growth of domestic credit to the 
private sector. Additionally, insufficient access to credit by small and medium-sized 
enterprises constrains their ability to expand and limits growth potential in SSA. Moreover, 
intriguingly, cost efficiency of non-SSA foreign banks is positively associated with CRPV, 
indicating statistical significance in accordance with the IVTobit results of specifications (4) 
and (6).  
 
FINDEP, the indicator showing money and quasimoney (M2) as a percentage of GDP, reveals 
a negative and statistically significant relationship with profit efficiency estimates of domestic 
and SSA foreign banks (only in terms of the Tobit result). This result suggests that improving 
profit efficiency of domestic and SSA foreign banks is not likely to have an impact on 
promoting financial depth in the SSA banking sector. With regards to cost efficiency, a 
negative and significant relationship was observed in domestic banks as well as non-SSA 
foreign banks (in the Tobit result). Thus, this empirical finding suggests that improving profit 
and cost efficiency of commercial banks does not appear to contribute to the promotion of 
financial development in SSA. 
5  Conclusions and policy implications 
This study has conducted the comparative analysis of cost and profit efficiency of domestic 
and foreign banks operating in 29 SSA countries by bank ownership (domestic bank, SSA 
foreign bank, or non-SSA foreign bank) as well as bank size during 2000-07. In terms of 
accounting ratios as well as estimated bank efficiency, the main findings of this study suggest 
that foreign banks tend to perform better than domestic banks for profit efficiency and that 
foreign bank entry appears to have an impact on improving the performance of domestic 
banks. In particular, SSA foreign banks seem to be more profit efficient than non-SSA foreign 
banks. This is in line with the previous finding (Claessens and Van Horen 2009) that foreign 
banks benefit significantly from being geographical and culturally (language) close, and that 
they are on average more profitable than banks that are geographically and culturally distant. 
 
Moreover, the trend for cost efficiency differs in results indicating that non-SSA foreign 
banks tend to be more efficient than SSA foreign banks for 2000-02 but this trend has 
reversed since 2003. Furthermore, the empirical findings of this study are consistent with the 
agency cost hypothesis explaining that the lower equity capital ratio is associated with higher 
profit efficiency, given the results that the ratio of EQTA has a negative and statistically 
significant impact on profit efficiency. 
 
In terms of efficiency by bank size, the empirical results tables show that the smaller the bank, 
the more profit efficient the bank will be. The trend for cost efficiency is that the medium 
sized or relatively large banks whose total assets are within the range of US$100 million to 
US$1 billion  tend to be the most cost efficient, though the small banks tend to be the most 
cost efficient in the case of SSA foreign banks. The finding of this study is in line with 
previous empirical findings as mentioned so far. In SSA, where many countries have 
underdeveloped financial systems, central banks need to be careful about encouraging banks 
to become bigger, if the target is to only improve bank efficiency. It is also important to note 
that SSA foreign banks whose home country is South Africa, Togo or Nigeria, including both 
Pan-African and  sub-Regional banks may play a key role for financial development in many 
SSA countries with underdeveloped financial systems. 
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It needs to be recognized that the study has a number of limitations. In particular, a precise 
enough cross-sectional analysis cannot be undertaken due to the delays in the availability of 
date as is often the case in research that measures bank efficiency. Despite these limitations, 
the findings of this study are expected to largely contribute to the existing knowledge on the 
banking sector performance in Africa through a comparative analysis of domestic and foreign 
banks.  
 
There are some extensions for further research. One of the extensions could be an empirical 
analysis of the relationship between bank efficiency and economic factors as well as an 
assessment of the effects of efficiency measures on those factors across countries with 
different levels of institutional, financial and/or economic development. Another extension 
could also include trade and institutional variables such as trade openness, political stability 
and government effectiveness. Especially, it is crucial to investigate how foreign bank entry 
affects the domestic banking system of low-income countries in SSA since there are few 
studies of these areas so far and not much is known empirically regarding their relative 
strengths and weaknesses, in spite of the fact that the dominant role of foreign banks 
increases. 
 
Furthermore, the empirical results of this study—that foreign banks tend to outperform domestic banks 
on profit efficiency, especially as SSA foreign banks seem to be more profit efficient than non-SSA 
foreign banks—suggest that accelerating the entry of SSA foreign banks (rather than enhancing the 
entry of non-SSA foreign banks) into SSA host countries may contribute to not only financial sector 
development there, but may also contribute to private sector development and economic development. 
Besides, as Nellor (2008) noted, several African countries with developing financial markets 
that are likely to attract institutional financial investors, are promising candidates to become 
part of a second generation of emerging market countries. They are the so-called ‘frontier 
market countries’, namely Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Zambia. Therefore, it may be fruitful to empirically investigate the effect of SSA 
foreign bank entry on the activities of domestic banks and financial sector development in 
SSA by incorporating some of the frontier market countries in SSA in the sample data. It may 
also be interesting to use a set of indicators of banking access such as branch and ATM 
density, average loan and deposit size, loan and deposit accounts per capita, percentage of 
people with bank accounts, collateral needed for loan, and percentage of firms with financing 
constraints. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Variables of financial accounting ratios 
Bank Variables   Definition  Category 
BTPTA  The ratio of profit before tax to total assets. It indicates profitability.  Operating 
asset ratios 
CIR  Cost to Income Ratio.  Performance 
ratios 
CSTFTA 
The ratio of customer deposits and short-term funding to total assets. 




EQNL  The ratio of equity to net loans.  Capital 
ratios 
EQTA 
The ratio of equity to total assets. As equity is a cushion against asset 
malfunction, this ratio measures the amount of protection afforded to 
the bank by the equity they invested in it. The higher this ratio the 
more protected is the bank. 
Capital 
ratios 
LLPNIR  The ratio of loan loss provision to net interest revenue.   Asset quality 
ratio 
NIETA  The ratio of net interest expenses to total assets.   Operations 
ratios 
NIM 
NIM is the difference between interest income (loans, securities, etc.) 
and interest expense (deposits, borrowed funds, etc.). It is an indicator 
of operational performance. 
Performance 
ratios 
NIRTA  The ratio of net interest revenue to total assets.   Operations 
ratios 
NLTA  The ratio of net loans to total assets. It indicates liquidity.   liquidity 
ratios 
OHDCTA  The ratio of overhead costs to total assets. It is a measure of 
efficiency. It is an indicator of the quality of operations. 
Operations 
ratios 
LNTA  The natural logarithm of the accounting value of the total assets, 
representing the bank size.   
Source: Bankscope database (2008). 28 
Table A2: Variables employed in cost and alternative profit functions 
Symbol Definition 
    Dependent Variables 
TC 
Total cost ($M) = loan loss provisions + interest expense + overheads (personnel expenses + other operating 
expenses) 
p  Net profit before tax ($M) 
       
    Outputs 
y1 Loans  ($M) 
y2  Other earning assets ($M) (Total Assets – loans – fixed assets) 
y3  Off-balance sheet items ($M) 
       
    Inputs 
w1  Price of funds (Interest Expense/Deposits & short term funding), in % 
w2  Price of non-interest expenses (overheads/fixed assets), in % 
   Netputs 
z1 Fixed  assets  ($M) 
z2 Equity  ($M) 
   Correlates 
    Bank specific characteristics 
b2A  Funding claims strategy (customer deposits / Loans + Other earning assets), in % 
b4  Fixed assets / total assets (in %) 
L1  Leverage ratio (Deposits & short term funding / equity) 
LR  Lending Rates (interest revenue/average loan amount) 
DR  Deposit rates (interest expenses/average deposit amount) 
  
    Environmental variables 
INFL  Inflation rate (Consumer Prices, in annual per centage) 
G  Real GDP growth rate (%) 
RL  Rule of Law (Governance Score: -2.5 to + 2.5) 
PG  Real GDP per capita growth (annual %)  
CRPV  Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)  
FINDEP  Money and quasi money (M2) as % of GDP  
Note: Amounts are in million US$  at constant prices (base year = 2000). 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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Table A3: Average cost and profit efficiency scores and number of banks by each country and ownership, 2000-07, 29 SSA Countries 
























Total number of 
foreign banks  Data 
Availability      2000¹ 2007² 
Angola  1.115   1.136 1.136  1.128    0.896   0.874 0.874    0.883    2  NA  3  5  0  3 
2000, 2001, 
2003-07 
Benin  1.044 1.052     1.052  1.047    0.904 0.896   0.896    0.901    3  1  NA  4  3  1  2000-07 
Botswana  1.078 1.085    1.149 1.122  1.103    0.656 0.629 0.668 0.652    0.653    3  3  2  8  NA  5  2000-07 
Burkina  Fa.  1.036 1.038    1.031 1.035  1.035    0.869 0.906 0.848 0.878    0.876    2  3  4  9  3  7  2000-07 
Burundi  1.077 1.102    1.053 1.081  1.081    0.883 0.843 0.885 0.861    0.864    1  1  1  3  2  2  2000-07 
Cameroon  1.033 1.071    1.074 1.073  1.069    0.782 0.894 0.823 0.838    0.833    1  1  4  6  2  5  2000-07 
CapeVerd.  1.065   1.072 1.072  1.069    0.819   0.817 0.817    0.818    1  NA  2  3  NA  2  2000,  2003-07 
Coted'Iv.  1.040 1.071    1.036 1.051  1.048    0.761 0.809 0.698 0.747    0.751    2  2  4  8  6  6  2000-07 
Gambia  1.046 1.018    1.032 1.027  1.034    0.903 0.924 0.898 0.908    0.906    1  1  1  3  1  2  2000-05 
Ghana  1.024 1.054    1.068 1.067  1.040    0.744 0.824 0.675 0.691    0.724    4  1  3  8  6  4  2000-06 
Kenya  1.067 1.034    1.053 1.044  1.062    0.713 0.654 0.558 0.605    0.689    19  3  3  25  8  6  2000-07 
Malawi  1.043 1.054     1.054  1.049    0.794 0.837   0.837    0.816    2  3  NA  5  2  3  2000-07 
Mali  1.056 1.048    1.026 1.047  1.050    0.893 0.901 0.922 0.902    0.899    3  2  1  6  2  3  2000-07 
Mauritania  1.022   1.044 1.044  1.029    0.900   0.888 0.888    0.897    2  NA  1  3  1  1  2000-03,  2007 
Mauritius  1.135 1.073    1.135 1.128  1.130    0.513 0.651 0.774 0.760    0.695    2  1  6  9  NA  7  2000-07 
Mozamb.  1.073 1.045    1.038 1.040  1.047    0.807 0.621 0.574 0.587    0.634    1  1  4  6  3  5  2000-07 
Namibia  1.087 1.063     1.063  1.072    0.487 0.491   0.491    0.490    2  3  NA  5  NA  3  2004-07 
Niger  1.027 1.042     1.042  1.039    0.888 0.915   0.915    0.909    1  3  NA  4  4  3  2000-07 
Nigeria  1.044 1.029    1.033 1.031  1.042    0.459 0.435 0.503 0.469    0.460    27  1  3  31  4  4  2000-07 
Senegal  1.018 1.031    1.027 1.028  1.027    0.857 0.906 0.853 0.872    0.870    1  2  4  7  3  6  2000-07 
Seychelles  1.035 1.060    1.019 1.048  1.044    0.748 0.712 0.720 0.714    0.724    1  1  1  3  NA  2  2003-07 
Sierra  Leo.  1.031 1.113    1.015 1.035  1.032    0.843 0.898 0.838 0.850    0.845    3  1  1  5  0  2  2000-07 
SouthAfrica  1.056   1.088 1.088  1.073    0.266   0.517 0.517    0.398    9  NA  5  14  NA  5  2000-07 
Sudan  1.054   1.108 1.108  1.084    0.809   0.834 0.834    0.823    3  NA  2  5  1  2  2000-07 
Swaziland  1.021 1.026     1.026  1.025    0.570 0.789   0.789    0.730    2  3  NA  5  NA  3  2000-07 
Tanzania  1.069 1.049    1.038 1.043  1.051    0.663 0.738 0.748 0.744    0.719    4  5  4  13  6  9  2000,  2003-07 
Uganda  1.037 1.084    1.036 1.047  1.045    0.792 0.733 0.771 0.762    0.769    3  2  6  11  8  8  2000-07 
Zambia  1.063 1.039    1.057 1.052  1.056    0.619 0.692 0.596 0.625    0.623    3  2  4  9  8  6  2000-07 
Zimbabwe  1.154 1.093    1.069 1.083  1.126    0.761 0.562 0.663 0.602    0.697    5  2  1  8  3  3  2000-04 
Total      113 48  70  231 76  118   
Note: Blank and NA denote ‘not available’ due to lack of data. (1) The total number of foreign banks in 2000 was obtained from Claessens and Jong-Kun (2002). (2) The total 
number of foreign banks in 2007 was calculated by author’s interpretations based on ownership information from the Bankscope database (2008). A a foreign bank is defined 
as having at least 50 per cent foreign ownership. 
Source: Author's calculations using bank level data from Bankscope database. 30 
 
Table A4: Summary Statistics of the Variables 
       Mean  Std. 
Dev.   Min  Max  Source 
A.  Alternative Profit Function           
p  Profit before tax ($M)  18.09   94.09   -
50.274  1230.65  
Bankscope, central banks and audited 
financial reports of individual banks, 
various years 
tc  Total Costs ($M)  82.82   456.19   0.239   5531.55   〃 
y1  Loans ($M)  558.92  3887.10   0.283   45402.27  〃 
y2  Other earning assets ($M)   255.39  1506.10   0.200   26247.65  〃 
y3  Off-balance sheet items ($M)   128.72  649.48   0.005   7968.66   〃 
z1  Fixed assets ($M)   12.46   41.58   0.053   433.14   〃 
z2  Equity ($M)   63.64   312.29   0.020   3518.36   〃 
w1  Price of funds (interest expense/deposits & short term funding) 
(%)   27.74   7.07   0.07  24414.29  〃 
w2  Price of non-interest expenses (overheads/fixed assets) (%)   261.10  2.49   19.23  3500.00   〃 
            
B. Environmental  Variables           
            
  Bank Specific Characteristics           
ta  Total assets ($M)  884.89  5552.23   1.09   71513.55   
b2a  Funding claims strategy (customer deposits / loans + other 
earning assets), in %  88.58   0.30   0.04   425.96  
Bankscope, central banks and audited 
financial reports of individual banks, 
various years 
b4  Agency Cost (fixed assets/total assets) (%)   3.69   0.03   0.05   31.31   〃 
l1  Leverage ratio (deposits & short term funding / equity)  (%)   1075.78  76.36   0.23   264650.00  〃 
lr  Lending rates (interest revenue/average loan amount) (%)  18.61   0.22   0.12   294.59    
dr  Deposit rates (interest expenses/average deposit amount) (%)  13.53   7.13   0.07   3669.82   〃 
Note: Total number of observations and banks are 1,200 and 231 respectively. $M denotes US$ million. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table A5: Estimated cost and profit functions 
Regressors Profit  Cost 
Betas  Variable  Name coefficient t-ratio coefficient t-ratio 
β₀ Constant  2.11   10.43*   0.14   7.61*  
β₁ ln  (Q1)  -0.20   -0.92   0.11   4.82*  
β₂ ln  (Q2)  -0.43   -2.68*   0.21   10.93*  
β₃ ln  (Q3)  -0.23   -1.93***   0.01   0.97  
β₄ lnW  (w1/w2)  0.35   2.23**   0.05   3.19*  
β₅ lnZ  (z1/z2)  1.12   6.20*   0.92   53.40*  
β₆ 0.5*lnQ1*lnQ1  -0.09   -0.49   0.24   11.72*  
β₇ 0.5*lnQ2*lnQ2  0.27   2.06**   0.18   13.69*  
β₈ 0.5*lnQ3*lnQ3  -0.17   -2.93*   0.01   0.84  
β₉ 0.5*lnW*lnW  0.00   -0.01   -0.06   -9.99*  
β₁₀ 0.5*lnZ*lnZ  0.50   3.80*   0.18   10.30*  
β₁₁ lnQ1*lnQ2  0.24   1.75***   -0.03   -1.77***  
β₁₂ lnQ1*lnQ3  0.22   2.50*   -0.01   -1.02  
β₁₃ lnQ1*lnW  0.04   0.37   0.06   4.38*  
β₁₄ lnQ1*lnZ  0.06   0.57   -0.13   -8.51*  
β₁₅ lnQ2*lnQ3  -0.13   -1.74***   -0.01   -1.70***  
β₁₆ lnQ2*lnW  -0.04   -0.49   0.13   15.12*  
β₁₇ lnQ2*lnZ  -0.15   -1.40   -0.16   -14.43*  
β₁₈ lnQ3*lnW  0.01   0.08   0.00   0.29  
β₁₉ lnQ3*lnZ  -0.02   -0.21   0.01   0.59  
β₂₀ lnW*lnZ  0.03   0.29   -0.04   -4.58*  
sigma squares 
 
0.23   10.23   0.01   10.34  
gamma    0.56   7.47   0.87   60.58  
mu        0.00   0.00  
eta              0.00   0.00  
log likelihood function    -609.35     1983.66  
LR test of one-sided error      349.62      761.00   
Note: Q1: y1/z2; Q2: y2/z2; Q3: y3/z2; W1: Price of Deposits (interest expense/deposits & short term funding); W2: 
Price of non-interest expenses (overheads/fixed assets); Z1: Fixed Assets (US$M); and Z2: Equity (US$M) where y1 
is Loans; y2 is Other Earning Assets; and y3 is off-balance sheet items. *, ** and *** correspond to 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance, respectively.  
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Bankscope (2009). 
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Table A6: Correlation between variables used in the Tobit regressions 
  PF CF  NIM  OHDCTA  B2 B4  L1  LR  DR  LNTA  LLPNIR  EQTA  NLTA  NIETA  INFL RL  G  PG  CRPV  FINDEP 
PF 1                                                                             
CF  -0.012    1                     
NIM  -0.071    0.004    1                    
OHDCTA -0.164    0.211    0.378    1                   
B2 0.259    -0.126    0.048    0.003    1                 
B4 -0.009    0.122    0.225    0.443    0.034    1                
L1 -0.096    -0.008    -0.032    -0.029    0.046    0.020    1               
LR  -0.164    -0.021    0.440    0.357    0.101    0.184    -0.024    1              
DR  -0.126   0.015   -0.024   -0.035   -0.110   -0.030   -0.004   -0.021   1                       
LNTA  -0.597   0.006   -0.188   -0.309   -0.041   -0.225   0.047   -0.166   0.061   1                     
LLPNIR  -0.019   -0.018   -0.088   0.091   0.097   0.071   0.070   -0.076   0.013   -0.011   1                   
EQTA  -0.134   0.059   0.154   0.165   -0.260   0.219   0.045   0.117   0.005   -0.287   -0.067   1                 
NLTA  0.081   0.023   -0.175   -0.253   -0.098   -0.135   0.008   -0.465   0.073   0.195   0.007   -0.053   1               
NIETA  -0.200   -0.327   0.194   0.182   -0.012   0.050   0.197   0.171   0.054   -0.125   0.077   -0.009   -0.047   1             
INFL  -0.002   -0.130   0.606   0.131   -0.007   0.065   -0.003   0.258   -0.005   -0.172   0.016   0.008   -0.127   0.226   1           
RL  0.080   -0.153   -0.224   -0.312   -0.027   -0.235   0.013   -0.224   0.046   0.158   -0.063   -0.148   0.195   -0.029   -0.206   1         
G  -0.022   0.064   -0.202   0.012   0.062   0.044   0.053   -0.005   0.002   0.017   0.015   0.024   -0.131   -0.234   -0.337   0.034   1       
PG  -0.117   0.005   -0.221   -0.036   0.055   -0.030   0.055   -0.029   0.018   0.091   0.007   -0.002   -0.083   -0.186   -0.311   0.138   0.973   1     
CRPV  -0.364   -0.179   -0.077   -0.210   -0.046   -0.163   -0.008   -0.195   0.165   0.371   -0.042   -0.017   0.308   0.090   -0.015   0.473  -0.079   0.043    1   
FINDEP  -0.137   -0.243   -0.169   -0.368   -0.011   -0.217   -0.004   -0.244   0.066   0.224   -0.051   -0.030   0.228   0.010   -0.053   0.628   -0.095   0.032   0.685   1 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Bankscope (2008, 2009) and IMF, IFS (2009). 
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Table A7: Second stage regression results, Tobit and IVTobit 
SSA Foreign Banks 
Dependent Variable  PEF  PEF  PEF  CEF CEF  CEF 
  (1) Tobit  (2) IVTobit  (3) IVTobit    (4) Tobit  (5) IVTobit  (6) IVTobit 
Bank Characteristics                         
NIM 0.001  -0.0325**        -0.0005  0.0033   
 (0.0011)  (0.0142)      (0.0006)  (0.0037)   
OHDCTA -0.0088***     0.0033    0.001    -0.004 
 (0.0017)    (0.0114)    (0.0009)    (0.0057) 
B2A  0.1104***   0.1509***   0.1429***     -0.0147  -0.0174*   -0.0211*  
 (0.0186)  (0.0379)  (0.0240)    (0.0091)  (0.0099)  (0.0119) 
B4  -0.4839***   -0.8172**   -0.9580**     0.0934  0.1196  0.2468 
 (0.1839)  (0.3719)  (0.4027)    (0.0931)  (0.0971)  (0.1989) 
L1  0.0042***   0.0058***   0.0051***     -0.0022***   -0.0024***   -0.0025***  
 (0.0009)  (0.0020)  (0.0011)    (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0006) 
LR -0.0727  0.5875**    -0.0799    -0.0462**    -0.1156  -0.0214 
 (0.0476)  (0.2925)  (0.0904)    (0.0227)  (0.0765)  (0.0449) 
DR -0.0438  -0.9730**    0.1009    -0.027  0.0911  -0.0431 
 (0.0783)  (0.4767)  (0.1001)    (0.0357)  (0.1246)  (0.0497) 
LNTA  -0.2072***   -0.1759***   -0.1865***     0.0018  -0.002  -0.0075 
 (0.0099)  (0.0212)  (0.0231)    (0.0051)  (0.0055)  (0.0114) 
LLPNIR 0.0001  -0.0003  0.0001    0.00001  0.0001  0.00004 
 (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0001)    (0.00005)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
EQTA  -0.0039***   -0.0008  -0.0033***     -0.0002  -0.0005  -0.0004 
 (0.0005)  (0.0015)  (0.0007)    (0.0002)  (0.0004)  (0.0004) 
NLTA  0.0011***   0.0027***   0.0013***     0.0003**   0.0001  0.0003**  
 (0.0003)  (0.0008)  (0.0003)    (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0001) 
NIETA  -0.0114***   -0.0037  -0.0136***     -0.0008  -0.0018  -0.0004 
 (0.0022)  (0.0061)  (0.0027)    (0.0011)  (0.0016)  (0.0013) 
Economic Conditions                         
INFL  -0.0004 0.0065**    -0.0003    0.0001 -0.0007  -0.000000002   
 (0.0003)  (0.0030)  (0.0002)    (0.0001)  (0.0008)  (0.0001) 
RL  0.0617***   0.0577***   0.0651***     0.0023  0.0026  0.0001 
 (0.0086)  (0.0186)  (0.0108)    (0.0044)  (0.0048)  (0.0054) 
G  0.0419***   0.0794***   0.0522***     -0.0032  -0.0073  -0.007 
 (0.0059)  (0.0176)  (0.0099)    (0.0030)  (0.0046)  (0.0049) 
PG  -0.0550***   -0.1003***   -0.0669***     0.0034  0.0085  0.008 
 (0.0061)  (0.0201)  (0.0113)    (0.0032)  (0.0052)  (0.0056) 
CRPV  -0.0003  0.001  0.0003    -0.0009***   -0.0010***   -0.0010***  
 (0.0006)  (0.0013)  (0.0007)    (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0004) 
FINDEP -0.0014***    -0.0001  -0.001    0.0003  0.0002  0.0001 
 (0.0004)  (0.0010)  (0.0006)    (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
Constant  1.1496***   0.8850***   0.9625***     0.9929***   1.0188***   1.0546***  
 (0.0458)  (0.0967)  (0.1434)    (0.0226)  (0.0253)  (0.0710) 
/sigma 0.0553        0.0285     
 (0.0024)        (0.0013)     
No. of Obs  262  262  262  262 262  262 
Wald chi2     387.17  1445.3     70.52  73.93 
P-value (Wald test)    0  0      0  0 
Wald test of exogeneity (Chi2)    5.63  1.08      1.25  0.85 
LR chi2  544.03        73.4     
P-value (LR test)  0          0         
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.*, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
PEF denotes profit efficiency and CEF denotes cost efficiency. For definitions of all independent variables refer to 
Appendix Tables A1 and A2. A two-step IVTobit is employed for the specifications (5) and (6), and also NIM and 
OHDCTA variables are instrumented for the IVTobit analysis. 
Source: Author’s computations using data from Bankscope (2008, 2009) and IMF, IFS (2009). 34 
Table A8: Second stage regression results, Tobit and IVTobit 
Non-SSA Foreign Banks 
Dependent  Variable  PEF  PEF  PEF  CEF  CEF  CEF 
    (1) Tobit  (2) IVTobit  (3) IVTobit    (4) Tobit  (5) IVTobit  (6) IVTobit 
Bank Characteristics               
NIM 0.0004  -0.0442***          0.0004 0.0114***       
 (0.0012)  (0.0075)      (0.0006)  (0.0025)   
OHDCTA  -0.0218***     -0.0208***     0.0053***     0.0072***  
 (0.0017)    (0.0051)    (0.0010)    (0.0028) 
B2A  0.0760***   0.2775***   0.0779***     -0.0109  -0.0605***   -0.0082 
 (0.0129)  (0.0413)  (0.0121)    (0.0072)  (0.0138)  (0.0067) 
B4 0.3464*    0.2003  0.3263    0.0554  0.0951  -0.0262 
 (0.1939)  (0.4219)  (0.3025)    (0.1067)  (0.1412)  (0.1653) 
L1  -0.0002**   -0.0002***   -0.0001***     0.0001***   0.0001***   0.0001***  
 (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.00004)    (0.00002)  (0.00003)  (0.00002) 
LR  -0.0828***   -0.0087  -0.0824***     0.0059  -0.0121  0.0037 
 (0.0166)  (0.0406)  (0.0184)    (0.0091)  (0.0136)  (0.0101) 
DR  -0.0124  0.0194  -0.0115    -0.0505***   -0.0582***  -0.0496***  
 (0.0078)  (0.0178)  (0.0079)    (0.0084)  (0.0093)  (0.0084) 
LNTA  -0.1663***   -0.1204***   -0.1646***     0.0156***   0.0046  0.0165***  
 (0.0081)  (0.0190)  (0.0082)    (0.0045)  (0.0064)  (0.0045) 
LLPNIR  0.0002**   -0.0007***   0.0002*     -0.0001  0.0002**   -0.0001 
 (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0001)    (0.00005)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
EQTA  -0.0040***   0.003  -0.0039***     -0.0001  -0.0018***   -0.00002 
 (0.0007)  (0.0020)  (0.0007)    (0.0004)  (0.0007)  (0.0004) 
NLTA  0.0015***   0.0013**   0.0015***     0.0003**   0.0003*   0.0003**  
 (0.0002)  (0.0005)  (0.0003)    (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0001) 
NIETA  -0.0117***   -0.0127**   -0.0125***     -0.0056***   -0.0055***   -0.0055***  
   (0.0023)  (0.0052)  (0.0025)    (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0013) 
Economic Conditions               
INFL 0.00004  0.0066***    0.0001    -0.0001 -0.0017***    0.00001 
 (0.0002)  (0.0011)  (0.0002)    (0.0001)  (0.0004)  (0.0001) 
RL  0.0237**   0.0767***   0.0260***     0.0103**   -0.0024  0.0113**  
 (0.0095)  (0.0220)  (0.0096)    (0.0052)  (0.0074)  (0.0052) 
G  0.0429***   0.1197***   0.0435***     0.0179 ***  -0.0011  0.0200***  
 (0.0075)  (0.0186)  (0.0083)    (0.0041)  (0.0062)  (0.0045) 
PG  -0.0487***   -0.1270***   -0.0494***     -0.0204***   -0.0011  -0.0224***  
 (0.0078)  (0.0195)  (0.0084)    (0.0043)  (0.0065)  (0.0046) 
CRPV  -0.0010***   -0.0006*   -0.0010***     0.0002**   0.0001  0.0002**  
 (0.0002)  (0.0004)  (0.0002)    (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
FINDEP 0.0004  -0.001  0.0004    -0.0004**    -0.0001  -0.0003 
 (0.0003)  (0.0008)  (0.0004)    (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0002) 
Constant  1.0898***   0.7945***   1.0826***     0.8708***   0.9437***   0.8530***  
 (0.0419)  (0.0877)  (0.0599)    (0.0231)  (0.0294)  (0.0328) 
/sigma 0.0712        0.0392     
   (0.0026)            (0.0014)         
No. of Obs  376  376  376    376  376  376 
Wald chi2     256.09  1118.9      150.78  217.46 
P-value (Wald test)    0  0      0  0 
Wald test of exogeneity (Chi2)    34.4  0.02      31.4  0.41 
LR chi2  561.44        220.17     
P-value (LR test)  0            0         
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.*, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. PEF denotes 
profit efficiency and CEF denotes cost efficiency. For definitions of all independent variables refer to Appendix Tables A1 and A2. A 
two-step IVTobit is employed for the specifications (5) and (6), and also NIM and OHDCTA variables are instrumented for the 
IVTobit analysis. 
Source: Author’s computations using data from Bankscope (2008, 2009) and IMF, IFS (2009). 35 
Table A9: Second stage regression results, Tobit and IVTobit 
Domestic Banks 
Dependent Variable  PEF  PEF  PEF    CEF CEF CEF 
  (1) Tobit  (2) IVTobit  (3) IVTobit    (4) Tobit  (5) IVTobit  (6) IVTobit 
Bank Characteristics                          
NIM  -0.0006  -0.0314***       0.0002  0.0069***    
  (0.0007) (0.0058)      (0.0003) (0.0017)   
OHDCTA  -0.0149***     -0.0193***     0.0033***     0.0049*  
  (0.0013)  (0.0053)    (0.0006)  (0.0026) 
B2A  0.1465***   0.0745**   0.1443***     -0.0399***   -0.0242**   -0.0391***  
  (0.0146) (0.0351) (0.0153)    (0.0071) (0.0105) (0.0074) 
B4 -0.2051**    0.0572  -0.1054    0.028  -0.0294  -0.0088 
  (0.1018) (0.2428) (0.1661)    (0.0502) (0.0730) (0.0817) 
L1  0.0031***   0.0008  0.0033***     -0.0008**   -0.0003  -0.0008**  
  (0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0007)    (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
LR  -0.0732***   0.4036***   -0.0596*     -0.0155  -0.1197***   -0.0203 
  (0.0261) (0.1161) (0.0362)    (0.0129) (0.0345) (0.0179) 
DR  -0.0039*   -0.0049**   -0.0040*     0.0002  0.0004*   0.0002 
  (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0021)    (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
LNTA  -0.1813***   -0.1626***   -0.1865***     0.00002  -0.004  0.002 
  (0.0063) (0.0132) (0.0089)    (0.0031) (0.0040) (0.0043) 
LLPNIR  -0.0001**   -0.0004***   -0.0001**     -0.00003 0.00002 -0.00003 
 (0.00004)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)    (0.00002)  (0.00003)  (0.00002) 
EQTA  -0.0014***   -0.0005  -0.0013***     -0.0009***   -0.0011***   -0.0010***  
  (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0005)    (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
NLTA  0.0015***   0.0039***   0.0014***     0.00005  -0.0005**   0.0001 
  (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0002)    (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
NIETA  -0.0040***   0.0050*   -0.0038***     -0.0050***   -0.0069***   -0.0050***  
  (0.0010) (0.0029) (0.0011)    (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0005) 
Economic Conditions                          
INFL  0.0008***   0.0030***   0.0007***     -0.0002***   -0.0007***   -0.0001**  
  (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0001)    (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
RL  0.1095***   0.1376***   0.1076***     -0.0024  -0.0086*   -0.0017 
  (0.0068) (0.0154) (0.0071)    (0.0034) (0.0046) (0.0035) 
G  0.0903***   0.1397***   0.0892***     0.0022  -0.0086*   0.0026 
  (0.0056) (0.0152) (0.0056)    (0.0028) (0.0045) (0.0028) 
PG  -0.0964***   -0.1494***   -0.0949***     -0.0028  0.0088*   -0.0033 
  (0.0059) (0.0159) (0.0059)    (0.0029) (0.0047) (0.0029) 
CRPV  -0.0007***   -0.0006  -0.0006**     0.0001  0.00005  0.00002 
  (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002)    (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
FINDEP  -0.0010***   -0.0005  -0.0012***     -0.0005***   -0.0006***   -0.0004*  
  (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0004)    (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Constant  0.9029***   0.7298***   0.9367***     1.0089***   1.0466***   0.9961***  
  (0.0344) (0.0721) (0.0525)    (0.0169) (0.0217) (0.0257) 
/sigma  0.0724       0.0359    
  (0.0022)       (0.0005)    
No. of Obs  558  558  558    558 558 558 
Wald chi2     696.63  3109.2      173.17  275.65 
P-value (Wald test)    0  0      0  0 
Wald test of exogeneity (Chi2)    27.73  0.65      26.13  0.36 
LR  chi2  1094.1       247.11    
P-value (LR test)  0            0         
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.*, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
PEF denotes profit efficiency and CEF denotes cost efficiency. For definitions of all independent variables refer to 
Appendix Tables A1 and A2. A two-step IVTobit is employed for the specifications (5) and (6), and also NIM and 
OHDCTA variables are instrumented for the IVTobit analysis. 
Source: Author’s computations using data from Bankscope (2008, 2009) and IMF, IFS (2009). 36 
Table A10: Second stage regression results, Tobit and IVTobit 
All Foreign Banks 
Dependent Variable  PEF  PEF  PEF    CEF  CEF  CEF 
    (1) Tobit  (2) IVTobit  (3) IVTobit    (4) Tobit  (5) IVTobit  (6) IVTobit 
Bank  Characteristics             
NIM 0.0002  -0.0376***          0.00002 0.0096***       
  (0.0008) (0.0064)      (0.0004) (0.0021)   
OHDCTA  -0.0160***     -0.0143***     0.0041***     0.0042*  
  (0.0013)    (0.0048)  (0.0007)    (0.0026) 
B2A  0.0826***   0.2335***   0.0845***     -0.0162***   -0.0546***   -0.0160***  
  (0.0104)  (0.0317)  (0.0105)  (0.0055)  (0.0106)  (0.0056) 
B4  0.0027 0.0662 -0.0691    0.0246 0.0067  0.019 
  (0.1435)  (0.3158)  (0.2435)  (0.0759)  (0.1055)  (0.1283) 
L1  -0.0001***   -0.0002**   -0.0001***     0.00004**   0.0001**   0.00004**  
 (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.00003)    (0.00002)  (0.00002)  (0.00002) 
LR  -0.0707***   0.024  -0.0730***     0.0037  -0.0202  0.0035 
  (0.0147)  (0.0380)  (0.0178)  (0.0078)  (0.0127)  (0.0095) 
DR  -0.0066  0.0085  -0.0061    -0.0523***   -0.0561***   -0.0522***  
  (0.0076)  (0.0166)  (0.0078)  (0.0077)  (0.0086)  (0.0078) 
LNTA  -0.1812***   -0.1404***   -0.1794***     0.0088***   -0.0015  0.0089**  
  (0.0062)  (0.0139)  (0.0073)  (0.0033)  (0.0046)  (0.0039) 
LLPNIR  0.0001*   -0.0006***   0.0001    -0.00001 0.0002***   -0.00001 
  (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)    (0.00004)  (0.0001) (0.0001) 
EQTA  -0.0054***   -0.0016  -0.0053***     0.0004*   -0.0006*   0.0004*  
  (0.0004)  (0.001)  (0.0004)  (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0002) 
NLTA  0.0016***   0.0015***   0.0016***     0.0004***   0.0004***   0.0004***  
  (0.0002)  (0.0004)  (0.0002)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
NIETA  -0.0089***   -0.0108***   -0.0089***     -0.0037***   -0.0032***   -0.0037***  
   (0.0015)  (0.0033)  (0.0015)    (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0008) 
Economic  Conditions             
INFL -0.0001  0.0068***    -0.00002    -0.0001 -0.0018***    -0.0001 
  (0.0002)  (0.0012)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0004)  (0.0001) 
RL  0.0399***   0.0638***   0.0403***     0.003  -0.0031  0.003 
  (0.0068)  (0.0151)  (0.0069)  (0.0036)  (0.005)  (0.0037) 
G  0.0480***   0.0891***   0.0494***     0.0063**   -0.0042  0.0064**  
  (0.005)  (0.0116)  (0.0061)  (0.0026)  (0.0039)  (0.0032) 
PG  -0.0565***   -0.1010***   -0.0579***     -0.0077***   0.0036  -0.0079**  
  (0.0052)  (0.0122)  (0.0062)  (0.0028)  (0.0041)  (0.0033) 
CRPV  -0.0010***   -0.0009***   -0.0010***     0.0001  0.00005  0.0001 
  (0.0001)  (0.0003)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
FINDEP 0.00002  -0.0005  0.0001    -0.0003**    -0.0002  -0.0003 
  (0.0003)  (0.0006)  (0.0004)  (0.0001)  (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
Constant  1.1159***   0.9357***   1.0976***     0.9101***   0.9557***   0.9086***  
  (0.0311)  (0.0609)  (0.0579)  (0.0164)  (0.0203)  (0.0306) 
/sigma  0.0714       0.0378    
   (0.0020)            (0.0011)         
No.  of  Obs  638  638  638  638  638  638 
Wald chi2     488.83  2137.25       142.45  202.8 
P-value (Wald test)    0  0      0  0 
Wald test of exogeneity (Chi2 )    34.81  0.11      35.78  0 
LR  chi2  980.26       237.53    
P-value (LR test)  0            0         
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.*, **, and *** correspond to 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. PEF denotes 
profit efficiency and CEF denotes cost efficiency. For definitions of all independent variables refer to Appendix Tables A1 and A2. A 
two-step IVTobit is employed for the specifications (5) and (6), and also NIM and OHDCTA variables are instrumented for the 
IVTobit analysis. 
Source: Author’s computations using data from Bankscope (2008, 2009) and IMF, IFS (2009). 
 